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ABSTRACT
The relationship between business organizations and the sovereign
agencies that regulate them is being redefined domestically and
abroad. In the context of corporate enforcement proceedings, a
critical challenge is how to achieve, most effectively, the timehonored public sector objectives of punishment, deterrence, financial
restitution and rehabilitation. At issue are important policy
considerations and at stake are the integrity and security of the
commercial marketplace.
The public sector increasingly must balance the pressures of limited
resources against the need to ensure that corporate citizens behave
not only lawfully, but ethically and responsibly. One solution that
has been adopted is the imposition of independent, private sector
oversight on companies and firms that have been the targets or
subjects of investigations. While its success to date has varied, this
evolving joint venture model is undeniably viable and it will become
even more appealing to enforcement officials in this global era of
fiscal restraint.
Answering to a Higher Authority addresses the evolution of private
sector oversight and its implementation domestically and in capitalist
nations abroad. With equal importance, this Article explores various
policy considerations and offers refinements and solutions to all
constituencies related to the selection, retention and deployment of
independent consultants and monitors.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between corporations, private sector creatures of
common and statutory law, and the sovereign entities that regulate them
has long been a complex one. Indeed, in the United States, and in many
other countries, it is continuously redefined. The enforcement dimension
of corporate regulation has been especially challenging, and American
officials and their Canadian and European counterparts have undertaken
to develop legal theories and principles for assessing and addressing
alleged organizational misconduct. Perhaps even more vexing in the
corporate context has been the ongoing effort to carry out, in both
criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, the undeniably legitimate and
time-honored public sector responsibility for punishment, deterrence,
financial restitution and rehabilitation. This is especially difficult
because the very nature of a corporation requires approaches that are
different from those adopted in cases involving malfeasance by
individuals.
This Article focuses on the imposition of independent private sector
oversight of corporate operations as a means of ensuring that an
enterprise acts as a responsible citizen. This Article also addresses the
deterrent effects these resolution mechanisms have on corporations, as
they are, in a sense, punitive in nature due to their attendant costs, risks
and stigma.
Scholars, the judiciary, legislators, enforcement officials, legal
practitioners, and corporate directors and executives have analyzed
exhaustively the causes of corporate wrongdoing.2 Typically, corporate
wrongdoing arises from a confluence of some or all of the following:
inadequate governance; greed; deluded or otherwise impaired judgment
or even psychotic behavior in the C-suite; an institutional culture that is
founded on and driven by problematic values; the pressures generated
by what now appears to be a perpetual capitalist cycle of “boom and
bust”; byzantine and often inconsistent regulations and administrative
rules; and inept or lax enforcement thereof. Consequently, the
rehabilitation of a firm that has run amok ethically and/or legally is a
2. See generally Stephany Watson, Fostering Positive Corporate Culture in the
Post-Enron Era, 6 TRANS. TENN. J. BUS. L. 7 (2004); Marianne M. Jennings, The
Disconnect Between and Among Legal Ethics, Business Ethics, Law, and Virtue:
Learning Not to Make Ethics so Complex, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 995 (2004); Kurt
Eichenwald, After a Boom, There Will Be Scandal. Count on It., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2002, at C3.
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decidedly different, and more arduous, undertaking than that crafted for
an individual, even an egregious recidivist.3
Not surprisingly, over the past several decades, regulators and
enforcement officials have come to understand that when more than
isolated misbehavior by lower or mid-level rogue employees is
involved, the rehabilitation of a business organization takes considerable
time and substantial resources, is fragile during its initial phases and can
only be confirmed through a sustained period of holistic and impartial
oversight.4 While some federal and state agencies may well have the
expertise to conduct some or all facets of that evaluation, none have the
resources to do so, particularly in light of recent sector-wide economic
implosions and derailments.5 Many have, therefore, turned to the private
sector for assistance in effectuating their enforcement goals. To date, the
success of these joint ventures has varied widely and as a matter of
public policy, they have generated vigorous debate and reassessment in
both sectors.6 It is the premise of this Article that, when informed by a
thorough understanding of its evolution, private sector oversight is not
3. See Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve
Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 703-07 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna &
Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1713, 1720-21 (2007).
4. See Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 703-07.
5. Although the American housing bubble is the most recent example, boom and
bust cycles have been endemic in capitalism since its earliest days. For instance, during
the Dutch Tulip Mania of the early 17th century, tulip bulbs were the subject of mass
market speculation and prices “skyrocketed to the point where the Dutch traded such
personal belongings as furniture, jewels, and even land to acquire the most highly
sought after tulips.” See Peter L. Cockrell, Subprime Solutions to the Housing Crisis:
Constitutional Problems with the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, 17
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1149, 1149 (2010). The Tulip Mania also demonstrated that
governments have attempted to manage and intervene in financial crises resulting from
the boom and bust cycles long before their recent attempts to stabilize economies in the
wake of the American housing bubble. See id. For additional discussion of sector-wide
economic collapses and government responses, see also Watson, supra note 2, at 7, 1015; Eichenwald, supra note 2.
6. See generally Ford & Hess, supra note 3; Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate
Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
793, 814-15 (2008); Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3; Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of
the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
89, 89 (2007); Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred?
Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1863, 1870-71 (2005).
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only viable, it is perhaps the only realistic option in the current era of
global fiscal restraint.
Part I of this Article addresses private sector oversight of corporate
affairs in both domestic and transnational settings. Part I.A.1 provides a
historical overview of this practice in the United States, followed in Part
I.A.2 by a discussion of key American agencies that have utilized
private sector oversight pursuant to their statutorily-granted powers. Part
I.A.3 provides case studies and addresses the methods adopted by the
United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”), the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or the
“Commission”), the United States Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”), the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(the “EPA”), and the United States Department of Labor (the “DOL”).
Part I.B focuses on corporate oversight abroad, offering case studies
from the United Kingdom and an overview of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development.
Part II of this study considers the ramifications of independent
private sector oversight; it reviews duties and responsibilities assumed
by the independent monitor tasked with overseeing a corporate entity. It
also addresses the selection, retention and ultimate deployment of an
independent consultant or monitor, and explores various policy
considerations attendant to private sector oversight of corporate entities.
I. PRIVATE SECTOR OVERSIGHT OF CORPORATE AFFAIRS
A. THE UNITED STATES
1. Historical Overview
The notion of private sector oversight of corporate affairs—an
amalgamation of American jurisprudence and enforcement and
regulatory initiatives—is now well developed in the United States. Over
roughly the past decade, American scholars and practitioners have
identified and analyzed many facets of the model, particularly in the
sovereign proceeding setting.7 No matter the designated moniker of the
corporate overseer—auditor, consultant, ombudsperson, monitor,

7. For a historical perspective of the evolution of the corporate monitor, see, e.g.,
Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 683-89; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1715-20;
O’Hare, supra note 6, at 89-93.
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receiver or review organization—this increasingly important role is the
offspring of the judiciary and the legislature. As such, it has been driven
by direct application of criminal law, quasi-criminal statutes, and
administrative regulations to business organizations, both publiclytraded and privately held.8
Courts have long used their equitable powers in the name of justice,
crafting remedies to address past wrongdoing and to prevent its
recurrence.9 As Justice Brandeis observed almost a century ago,
“[c]ourts have . . . inherent power to provide themselves with
appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties,”
which “includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court
to aid judges in the performance of specific duties, as they may arise in
the progress of a cause.”10 Indeed, the judiciary’s authority to appoint
special masters and receivers is codified in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.11
Private sector oversight of companies and firms has been spawned
by the judicial expansion of legislatively created enforcement authority
powers.12 Federal securities laws enacted in the wake of the 1929 stock
market crash endow the SEC with broad discretion and a panoply of
remedies to protect investors and financial markets.13 In this regard,
8. See Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 683-89; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3,
at 1715-20; Greenblum, supra note 6.
9. See Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REV. 427, 432-39
(2001).
10. In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920) (citations omitted). See Khanna &
Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1715 (discussing the authority of court-appointed special
masters); Robert E. Buckholz, Jr. et al., The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 826-27 (1978).
These court appointed agents are identified by a confusing plethora
of titles: ‘receiver,’ ‘Master,’ ‘Special Master,’ ‘master hearing
officer,’ ‘Monitor,’ . . . ‘Administrator’ . . . . Terminological
confusion is compounded by functional confusion. A ‘master’ may
at the same time gather information, make recommendations, and act
to implement a decree. While the first two activities are part of the
Master’s traditional role, the latter is not.
Id.
11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (masters) and 66 (receivers).
12. For a discussion of the rise and use of receivers in SEC enforcement actions, as
part of the ancillary relief available under securities law, see Morrissey, supra note 9, at
444-47.
13. See Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) § 8A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77a et
seq. (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) § 21(d) (providing
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some observers primarily credit the equitable powers of the courts in the
context of federal securities laws, which provide injunctive relief to
effectuate the Commission’s mandates.14 As the SEC’s use of
injunctions blossomed, so did the scope of equitable relief that the
Commission sought.15 The 1960s saw the expansion of what some
observers call “ancillary relief”; with increasing frequency, the federal
district courts imposed, in civil and enforcement proceedings, equitable
remedies – such as the requirement of an accounting or the appointment
of receivers – that were not explicitly recognized in the pertinent statutes
and regulations, but were complimentary and logical extensions of
statutory enforcement tools. It was an appealing approach in an era of
judicial activism.16
Judge Stanley Sporkin’s bias towards the use of consultants during
his tenure as Enforcement Chief of the SEC may be viewed as another
step in the evolution of the Commission’s use of the private sector to
supplement its resources and fulfill its enforcement mandate.17 More
recently, the SEC has utilized “undertakings” in negotiated resolutions
of security law violations in order to transform corporate culture,
including the appointment of independent private sector consultants.18
Such measures were fully embraced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(“SOX”),19 which granted the SEC the authority to seek, and the courts
the authority to grant, “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or
necessary for the benefit of investors.”20

for, among other remedies, “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary
for the benefit of investors”) & 21C(a) (Commission’s authority to craft orders and take
steps to “effect compliance”), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006); Richard G. Wallace & Benjamin
R. Dryden, Use of Independent Consultants as a Remedy in Securities Enforcement
Actions, 42 BNA’S SEC. REG. & L. REP. 750 (2010). In his article, SEC Injunctions,
Professor Morrissey details the use of injunctions under federal securities law as an
example of an enforcement authority’s application for, and use of, the court’s equitable
powers to carryout statutorily prescribed policy. See Morrissey, supra note 9.
14. See Morrissey, supra note 9, at 436-39; see also O’Hare, supra note 6, at 89,
90, 93.
15. E.g., O’Hare, supra note 6, at 89, 90, 93; Barnard, supra note 6.
16. Morrissey, supra note 9, at 444-45; see O’Hare, supra note 6, at 89, 92-93.
17. Barnard, supra note 6.
18. Id. at 795-96.
19. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5)
(2006)); see O’Hare, supra note 6, at 89, 93.
20. Exchange Act § 21(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2006).
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In the same vein, the appointment of trustees in proceedings
pursuant to remedial power in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”)21 is now viewed as a conceptual precursor
to corporate monitorships.22 The same concept has resulted in the
appointment of trustees by federal bankruptcy courts;23 Independent
Review Organizations (“IROs”) by the Office of the Inspector General
of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (the
“OIG”) in negotiated Corporate Integrity Agreements (“CIAs”); and
stipulations and agreements by the United States Department of Labor
(the “DOL”), and in enforcement proceedings brought under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”).24
Without question, the most influential force in the development of
private sector oversight of corporate organizations has been the
application of criminal law to business organizations, building on the
initial recognition of corporate liability in 1909.25 In 1991, the United
States Sentencing Commission (the “Sentencing Commission”)
promulgated Guidelines that focused on companies and firms.26 The
21.
22.

18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006).
See Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 683; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at
1716-17. Still another recognized predicate to corporate monitorships, public law
litigation aimed at restructuring and reforming public institutions, like RICO actions,
often entails consent decrees that require a third party to oversee the implementation of
remedial efforts. See Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 683; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL p. 186 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov
/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/civrico.pdf (“[C]ourts are vested with broad
equitable powers to impose highly intrusive remedies to redress unlawful conduct,
especially in institutional reform cases.”).
23. The authority to appoint a bankruptcy examiner is found in 11 U.S.C. 1104(c)
(2010). Bankruptcy examiners are empowered to investigate the debtor and any matters
relevant to the case or formation of a plan, and often do when it would be in the best
interests of the creditors, equity stockholders or the estate. Statements of the
investigation are then filed with the court. See 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2010); see also
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548
(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.
25. See New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493
(1909); see also James R. Copland, Regulation by Prosecution: The Problems with
Treating Corporations as Criminals, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH,
(Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/press_release_cjr13.pdf.
26. Though initially deemed mandatory, the United States Supreme Court’s
decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory in nature.
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Sentencing Guidelines have been amended since, most recently in 2010,
to, among other things, include in an application note specific reference
to the use of third party, professional “advisors” as a remedial step in
furtherance of the implementation or enhancement of an organization’s
compliance and ethics program.27
Beginning in the early 1990s, federal prosecutors increasingly used
non- and deferred prosecution agreements (“NPAs” and “DPAs”) as
resolution vehicles in corporate investigations.28 Since 1993, the United
States Department of Justice (the “DOJ” or the “Department”) has
entered into at least 170 such agreements.29 As the DOJ has refined its
approach to addressing corporate misconduct through measures short of
criminal convictions, corporate monitors have become a mainstay
component of resolution models.30
27. AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 31, 34-35 (May 3, 2010).
Officials within the DOJ have acknowledged the role of “independent compliance
monitors” in transforming corporate cultures in the wake of wrongdoing. See Wall
Street Fraud and Fiduciary Duties: Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate Detterrent for
Willful Violations? Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm.
on Crime and Drugs, 111th Cong. (2010) 13 [hereinafter Breuer Testimony] (statement
of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
28. See Greenblum, supra note 6; Prosecutors Adhered to Guidance but DOJ
Could Better Communicate: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin.
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009) [hereinafter Larence
Testimony] (statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office).
29. Larence Testimony, supra note 28 (first resolution agreements executed in
1993). The Department does not maintain statistics concerning the number of NPAs and
DPAs it has executed that are immediately accessible to the public, and the GAO’s
study, which identified 152 such agreements combined, is the latest government survey
of such figures. More recently, private sector practitioners have undertaken a review of
publicly available NPAs and DPAs entered into in the past decade, compiling statistics
that align generally with those of the GAO reports and indicate a continuing trend in
their use, raising the total number of such agreements through 2010 well over 170. See
Melissa Aguilar, DPA-NPA Tally Marks Decade’s Second Highest, COMPLIANCE
WEEK, Jan. 10, 2011.
30. Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 682; Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1721.
Although not discussed in depth, the authors recognize that the histories of corporate
compliance and ethics programs and criminal and quasi-criminal resolution agreements
have been the subject of significant scholarship. Writers have traced the evolution of
corporate compliance programs from antitrust prosecutions in the 1960s to the
enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 (which is coming full circle
with the recent DOJ focus on violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). See
Mark Brzezinski, Obama Administration Gets Tough on Business Corruption Overseas,
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Over the past several decades in both Democratic and Republican
administrations, the Department has focused decisively on corporate
malfeasance at home and abroad. In particular, the DOJ has emphasized
the importance of corporate compliance and ethics programs and, as a
means of establishing or implementing them, the use of resolution
agreements and corporate monitors.31 For instance, in response to a rash
of high-profile acts of corporate deceit, in 2002, President George W.
Bush created the Corporate Fraud Task Force (the “Task Force”), which
remains active today and draws on the talents and resources of more
than a dozen combined federal departments, agencies, U.S. Attorneys’
Offices and divisions of the Department. To date, the Task Force has
obtained over a thousand corporate fraud convictions of corporations
and senior executives, including hundreds of chief executive and
financial officers, and vice presidents.32 Likewise, the DOJ has
identified the prosecution of foreign corrupt practices as a top
enforcement priority, bringing more Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the
“FCPA”) cases in the past five years than in the balance of the statute’s
history since its passage in 1977.33 In all of these complex cases,
recognizing that a criminal conviction, particularly in a highly regulated
industrial sector, can be the catalyst for the demise of an organization,

WASH. POST, May 28, 2010, (reflecting on Lanny Breuer’s, Chief of DOJ Criminal
Division, speech at the Council on Foreign Relations May 4, 2010, in which he
expressed the Obama administration’s goal of creating “‘a global consensus that
corruption is unacceptable . . . .’”). This continued in defense industry reform in the
1980s and the specific reference to compliance and ethics programs in the Guidelines in
the 1990s, which were formally recorded in 2004 and revised in 2010. For a perspective
on the evolution of corporate compliance programs, see, e.g., , Ford & Hess, supra note
3, at 689-92. For a discussion of the evolution of deferred prosecution agreements, see,
e.g., , Benjamin M. Greenblum, supra note 6, at 1866-71.
31. Brzezinski, supra note 30; OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2001-2009, 30 (2009); The
President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/archive
/dag/cftf (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter The President’s Corporate Fraud Task
Force]; see also AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 27, at 31,
34-35.
32. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 31, at 30; see also The
President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, supra note 31.
33. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 31, at 31; see also The
President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, supra note 31.
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the DOJ has publicly endorsed the use of independent corporate
monitors in resolution agreements with companies and firms.34
A decade into the new millennium, there is no question that
enforcement authorities and regulators now embrace the notion of
independent private sector oversight in both the boardroom and the CSuite.35 As this Article discusses, the corporate monitor and its
counterpart in analogous proceedings, when properly selected and
deployed, promotes detection, prevention, and remediation of corporate
misconduct, due in large part to the ability of the appointed individual to
impart expertise and resources to the oversight of a corporation’s
affairs.36
2. Key American Agencies
a. The United States Department of Justice
i.

Sentencing Guidelines

A meaningful review of the evolution of the appointment of
corporate monitors in federal criminal investigations necessarily begins
with the Sentencing Commission. Created by Congress in 1984 as part
of the Sentencing Reform Act, it serves as “an independent commission

34. Breuer Testimony, supra note 27, at 12-13 (noting that as part of a resolution
agreement, the DOJ may require that corporations retain “independent compliance
monitors in appropriate cases”). Mr. Breuer further explained that the DOJ “believes
that corporate guilty pleas and DPAs, corporate fines, and the imposition of
independent compliance monitors serve the important criminal enforcement goals of
specific deterrence, general deterrence, and rehabilitation.” Id. at 36. Later that month,
Mr. Breuer again endorsed the use of independent compliance monitors in appropriate
cases. Prepared remarks to Compliance Week 2010 – 5th Annual Conference for
Corporate Financial, Legal, Risk, Audit & Compliance Officers, (May 26, 2010)
(statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen.).
35. See Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred: Exploring
the Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1481, 1486 n. 17 (2007). Of the 152 resolution agreements the DOJ entered into
since 1993, 94 were executed between 2004 and 2009; Corporate Crime: DOJ Has
Taken Steps to Better Track Its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, But
Should Evaluate Effectiveness, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 5, 16
(2009), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-110 (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
36. Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 692; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
(Nov. 1, 2010); Breuer Testimony, supra note 27.
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in the judicial branch of the United States.”37 The Sentencing
Commission is charged with establishing “sentencing policies and
practices for the Federal criminal justice system”38 and developing a
“means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and
correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of
sentencing” as described in the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure.39
To this end, the Sentencing Commission is responsible for, among other
things, creating and distributing to the federal courts guidelines, and
related application notes and policy statements, for determining the
sentences in criminal cases.40
Initially, Congress required judges to calculate sentences pursuant
to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the “Guidelines”).41
In the wake of their promulgation over a period of two decades, the
precepts and provisions of the Guidelines were litigated extensively.42 In
2005, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory in nature.43
Today, when imposing a sentence in a criminal case, a federal
district judge must “consider,” inter alia, the Guidelines and their
supporting application notes and policy statements.44 The Guidelines
establish the presumptive parameters of a sentence “unless the [district]
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
37. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006). Today, the Commission is comprised of seven
voting members and one nonvoting member. The President appoints the Commission’s
seven voting members, with the advice and consent of the Senate; the Attorney General
or the Attorney General’s designee is the nonvoting member. At most, three federal
judges serve on the Commission, and, as a measure of political balance, no more than
four members may be from the same political party. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1).
39. Id.; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)-(2).
41. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989).
42. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 569 (2002); United States v. Watts,
519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995); United States v.
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 88-89 (1993); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
43. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). For purposes of appellate review, sentences calculated
in accordance with the Guidelines are presumed reasonable. See United States v. Rita,
551 U.S. 338, 347-48 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005); see
also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (explaining that “the Guidelines
should be the starting point and the initial benchmark”).
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[Sentencing Commission] . . . .”45 Judges may, for instance, deviate
below a statutory minimum sentence “upon motion of the Government .
. . so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person who committed an offense.”46 In the
absence of a governing Guideline, the federal courts have license to
impose such other sentences, as they deem appropriate under the
circumstances presented.47
Effective November 1, 1991, Chapter 8 of the Guidelines48 is
designed to advance the dual prerogatives of “just punishment” and
“deterrence.”49 The key provisions of the current version of the
Organizational Guidelines have been in place, with only slight revisions,
since 2004.50 Although no longer binding on the courts,51 the Guidelines
are the presumptive rubric under which criminal punishment is imposed;
they enunciate criteria for good corporate citizenship and serve as a
framework for best practices in the area of ethics and compliance.52
In part, the Organizational Guidelines are designed to create
meaningful incentives for corporations to develop compliance and ethics
programs that are tailored to the realities of their industrial sector and
their particular organizations. These compliance and ethics programs
should include the following components, among others: (1) the
development of policies and procedures that prevent and detect criminal
activity; (2) overall responsibility for the program seated in senior
45.
46.
47.
48.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).
Id. § 3553(e).
Id. § 3553(b)(1).
Hereinafter, the Chapter 8 Sentencing Guidelines shall be referred to as the
“Organizational Guidelines.”
49. PAULA DESIO, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN
OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES (2010); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8, introductory cmt. (2009). When the Organizational Guidelines were
promulgated, they were mandatory. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367
(1989).
50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8, historical note (Nov. 1, 2010). The
provisions are applicable to business organizations convicted of felony and Class A
misdemeanor offenses, which, through the principle of vicarious liability, may be held
criminally responsible for the acts of their agents. Id. § 8, introductory cmt. In this
regard, an organization’s agents (e.g., individual employees) may be sentenced in
accordance with other chapters of the Guidelines, alongside the organization. Id.
51. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
52. Win Swenson & Joe Murphy, Changes Coming in Company Compliance
Programs: The U.S. Sentencing Commission Adjusts the Rules, WHITE COLLAR CRIME
REPORT, 10 May 7, 2010 at 1.
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personnel supported by adequate resources and operational authority
who report to the organization’s board of directors or appropriate
controlling authority charged with the oversight of the program; (3) a
mechanism to exclude from senior-level, operational or authority
functions of the corporation anyone who has participated in an activity
contrary to the interests of, or espoused by, an effective compliance and
ethics program; (4) periodic, effective training on, and communication
of, the corporation’s policies and procedures throughout all levels of the
enterprise, including, as appropriate, its agents; (5) reasonable steps
towards achieving compliance, including monitoring and auditing
activity to detect misconduct, periodic assessment of risks and the
program’s efficacy and implementation of a system to report suspected
or actual wrongdoing without fear of retaliation; (6) consistent
enforcement of compliance standards and disciplinary mechanisms; and
(7) reasonable steps to respond to and prevent similar wrongdoing in the
future, including program modifications.53
Part 8A of the Organizational Guidelines covers their application
requiring first a determination under Part B of the “requirements and
options relating to restitution, remedial orders, community service, and
notice to victims,”54 before addressing the imposition of a fine,55 and
then an evaluation under Parts D and E, respectively, of the
“requirements and options relating to probation”56 and “special
assessments, forfeitures, and costs.”57
Part B provides for restitution, remediation, community service and
notice to victims, as appropriate under the facts of the case. Remedial
orders “may require the organization to remedy the harm caused by the
53. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 36, § 8B2.1(b)(1)-(7),
introductory cmt; see DESIO, supra note 49. As discussed infra § I.A.2.c.1, these
components differ slightly from guidance promulgated by the OIG. In particular, the
OIG, as part of its “seven elements” of an effective compliance program, advocates the
institution of a hotline for reporting anonymously suspected instances of noncompliance, but is silent as to efforts to avoid delegating authority for the compliance
program to individuals who exhibit a propensity toward unethical, or non-compliant or
illegal conduct. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(1)-(7)
(Nov. 1, 2010) with, e.g., Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23731, 23732-33 (May 5, 2003).
54. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8A1.2(a) (Nov. 1, 2010).
55. Id. § 8A1.2(b).
56. Id. § 8A1.2(c).
57. Id. § 8A1.2(d).
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offense and to eliminate or reduce the risk that the instant offense will
cause future harm.”58 As the commentary to this subpart explains, such
orders may require “corrective action by the organization” in order to
“prevent future injury from the instant offense.”59 In some cases, a
judicial mandate may not be necessary, and should, instead, issue from
an appropriate governmental regulatory agency and be “coordinated
with any administrative or civil actions taken by the appropriate
governmental regulatory agency.”60 This case-specific flexibility
provides the foundation for sentences requiring, among other things, the
prompt development of an effective compliance and ethics program, if
one was not in place at the time of the offense.61
Part B also creates a framework for the assessment of an existing
compliance and ethics program, or, if one was not in place at the time of
the offense, guidance for the creation and adoption of one.62 Credit in
the determination of an organization’s culpability score is available only
if the enterprise did not “unreasonably delay[] reporting the offense to
appropriate governmental authorities.”63 Likewise, the credit will not be
given if “high-level personnel . . . participated in, condoned, or [were]
willfully ignorant of the offense.”64 If an effective compliance and ethics
program did not exist at the time of the offense, the Guidelines
recommend the implementation of one as a condition of probation.65 The
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. § 8B1.2(a).
Id. § 8B1.2 cmt.
Id.
Id. § 8D1.4(b)(1).
See generally id. § 8B2.1.
Id. § 8C2.5(f)(2).
Id. § 8C2.5(f)(3). Commentary regarding these restrictions was robust prior to
the adoption of a related proposed amendment which became effective November 1,
2010. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 39-41 (May 3,
2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/Reader-Friendly/201005
03_RFP_Amendments.pdf.
65. Id. § 8D1.4(b)(1). Institutional integrity, sound values and an appropriate “tone
at the top,” individual and organizational acceptance of responsibility, effective selfpolicing, and transparency with key stakeholders are the tenets of any such program. To
wit, the core components of an effective ethics and compliance program include:
1. Appointment of a “high-level” executive to serve as the focal point and have
operational responsibility for the organization’s compliance activities. Id. §
8B2.1(b)(2)(A-B);
2. Effective reporting channels to the organization’s “governing authority” or
appropriate subgroup thereof, usually the board of directors or a committee of
the board;
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appointment of a corporate monitor can ensure, inter alia, that a robust
compliance program be developed and adopted.66

3. Adequate resources and recognized authority throughout the organization to be
effective. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C);
4. Standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal conduct that are
widely disseminated throughout the organization and about which the
organization’s governing authority must be knowledgeable and the
implementation of which it must oversee. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(1)-(2);
5. Mandatory, periodic training and the dissemination of information throughout
the organization. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A);
6. Monitoring and assessment to test the validity of the program’s practices and
ability to detect misconduct. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A)-(C);
7. Periodic evaluation of the program’s efficacy, combined with organizational
risk assessments. Id. § 8B2.1(c);
8. A publicized, anonymous and non-retaliatory system that allows employees to
report and/or seek guidance confidentially with respect to suspected
misconduct. Id. § 8B2.1 (b)(5)(A)-(C);
9. Consistent promotion and enforcement of the ethics and compliance program in
a way that encourages compliance and publicizes disciplinary measures for
engaging in misconduct or failing to prevent or report misconduct. Id. § 8B2.1
(b)(6); and
10. Once detected, swift, responsive action to investigate and prevent recurrence of
the misconduct.
Id. at § 8B2.1 (b)(7).
While federal enforcement officials have taken the lead in developing these key
components of an effective ethics and compliance program, a growing number of their
state-level counterparts also have done so. See, e.g., James G. Sheehan, Lessons from
Mandatory Compliance: Integrity Through Compliance Measurement, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN. (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.omig.state.ny.us/data/images/stories/
presentations/4182010_hcca.pdf; see also, e.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 61895 n.13 (Nov. 15,
1999) (corporate integrity agreements “require many of the elements included in this
compliance program guidance”); infra note 254 and accompanying text.
The efficacy of the organization’s compliance and ethics program, as evaluated
in accordance with the guidance of § 8B2.1, affects the determination of the
organization’s culpability under § 8C2.5 and, therefore, the fine to be levied, if any.
Among others, key factors that influence the amount of the fine are whether the
organization self-reported the offense, cooperated in the investigation or accepted
responsibility, all hallmarks of a compliant and ethical culture. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (b)-(g) (Nov. 1, 2010).
66. Probation orders may also require periodic reports, regular or unannounced
inspections of books and records or business operations, as well as interviews of
knowledgeable individuals, conducted by a probation officer or an appointed expert
whose fees must be paid by the corporation. Id. §§ 8D1.1(a)(1)-(2), 8D1.4(b)(3).
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In April 2010, the Sentencing Commission promulgated
amendments to the Organizational Guidelines and proposed them to
Congress; they became effective on November 1, 2010.67 Aside from
technical modifications, the amendments clarify the guidance under
§ 8B2.1.68 In addition to taking reasonable steps to remediate the
criminal conduct, the current Guidelines call on organizations to
undertake measures that deter and prevent the recurrence of known
misconduct.69 Companies and firms, in short, are expected to evaluate
periodically their compliance and ethics programs to ensure efficacy,
through risk assessments and validation exercises,70 which may reveal
weaknesses or shortcomings that need to be addressed. The Guidelines
suggest that an organization “may . . . use . . . an outside professional
advisor to ensure adequate assessment and implementation of any
modifications.”71 After public comment, the Sentencing Commission
retracted its proposal for the retention of a corporate monitor as an
appropriate remediation step, opting instead to provide guidance that
reasonable corrective efforts may include, among other actions, enlisting
the services of an advisor to identify weaknesses in an organization’s
compliance and ethics program and assist in the implementation of
solutions to fortify such a program.72
67.
68.

Id. at app. C, amend. 744.
The amendments provide meaningful guidance as to what constitutes a
reasonable response to detected criminal conduct as required in subsection (b)(7), and
revise § 8C2.5 (Culpability Score) to increase the availability of the sentencing credit
for having an effective compliance and ethics program in place. See PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 64, at 31.
69. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (Nov. 1, 2010).
70. Id. § 8B2.1(c).
71. See id. § 8B2.1(b)(7), cmt. 6.; see also PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 64, § 8B2.1 app. n.6. As scholars have observed,
there exists a tension between the prerogatives of the organization and the desired
behavior, emanating from the requirement of self-reporting undetected offenses in order
for the organization to avail itself of the culpability score credit. The Sentencing
Commission has incorporated the recommended conditions of probation requiring the
development, court approval, implementation, publication, reporting and testing of a
compliance and ethics program described in former § 8D1.4(c) into the revised
§ 8D1.4(b). Still operative is the requirement that the periodic reports, called for now
under the proposed § 8D1.4(b)(3), be shared with “any governmental regulatory body
that oversees conduct of the organization relating to the instant offense.”
72. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8B2.1(b)(7), cmt. 6. (Nov. 1, 2010);
see also PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 64,
§ 8B2.1 app. n.6; see also Swenson & Murphy, supra note 52, at 4.

2012]

ANSWERING TO A HIGHER AUTHORITY

317

The Sentencing Commission considered comments from, among
others, the Practitioners Advisory Group (the “PAG”) and Association
of Corporate Counsel, before declining to include an explicit reference
to corporate monitors in the application notes to § 8B2.1(b)(7).73
Practitioners and in-house counsel expressed concerns regarding the
potential costs to a corporation, the inability to constrain the monitor’s
scope of work74 and the presumption that would arise from an explicit
reference to monitors in all resolutions of corporate investigations (even
when conduct is detected that does not warrant prosecution).75 They also
argued that corporations and probation departments can, in many cases,
effectively remediate the circumstances that led to the criminal conduct
at issue.76

73. See Testimony of David Debold, Chair, Practitioners Advisory Grp. (the
“PAG”), before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 1 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/2
0100317/Debold%20_PAG_testimony.pdf [hereinafter Debold Testimony]; Testimony
of Susan Hackett, Assoc. of Corporate Counsel, before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3
(Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs
/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100317/Hackett_ACC_Testimony.pdf [hereinfter
Hackett Testimony]. The Ethics and Compliance Officers Association joined the
recommendation against specific mention of monitors in the proposed Guidelines,
favoring language describing an “independent, qualified, third party” as evincing a
voluntary decision to “engage an independent verifier” over what it perceived to be “a
court-ordered mandate to hire a monitor.” Testimony of Tim C. Mazur, Chief Operating
Officer of the Ethics and Compliance Officer Assoc., before the U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n 2 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_
Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20100317/Mazur_testimony.pdf.
The Sentencing Commission retreated from proposed language that would have
suggested that organizations engage an “independent monitor,” opting instead to
suggest the retention of an “outside professional” to assess and advise with respect to
corporate compliance functions. Although the corporate community resisted the
initially proposed “monitor” language, some commentators attach little significance to
the decision to replace “monitor” with reference to an unspecified, outside expert. See
Swenson & Murphy, supra note 52, at 4.
74. Debold Testimony, supra note 73 at 2. PAG suggested instead a requirement
that the company pay an expert to assist the probation department in its supervision of
the company’s compliance with the terms of probation. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The Association of Corporate Counsel agreed with PAG’s comments and
recommendation to remove what it termed the “monitor option,” noting its fear that
judges would take the inclusion of the reference to monitors as a best practice that
should be routinely considered, “rather than the nuclear option that most folks who’ve
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ii. DOJ Guidance
The United States Attorneys’ Manual (the “USAM”) provides
internal guidance on a broad array of topics to United States Attorneys,
Assistant United States Attorneys and DOJ prosecutors.77 Among other
things, the USAM provides parameters for exercising prosecutorial
discretion in resolving investigations involving corporate targets.78 To
amplify and clarify this guidance, the Department has also issued a
series of memoranda over the past decade. Beginning in June 1999 with
a memorandum entitled The Federal Prosecution of Corporations, by
then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder (the “Holder
Memorandum”),79 and continuing most recently with the issuance of a
memorandum by Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip in August 2008
(the “Filip Memorandum”),80 a total of four memoranda have enunciated
principles for deciding whether to investigate or charge business
organizations, and the appropriateness of available alternatives to
prosecution.81 This guidance seeks to inject consistency and a certain
degree of fairness into the pursuit and resolution of corporate criminal
investigations and promotes the Department’s goals of punishing,
deterring, and remediating such violations.82
ever worked in a monitor situation perceive it to be.” Hackett Testimony, supra note 73,
at 3.
77. USAM, 1-1.100. The USAM is a comprehensive resource tool that preempts
DOJ statements, except those of the Attorney General. USAM, 1-1.200.
78. See, e.g., USAM 9-16.325; USAM 9-27.600-.750; USAM 9-28.100, et seq.
79. “Federal Prosecution of Corporations” Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr.,
Deputy Attorney Gen., to All Component Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16,
1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/
charging-corps.PDF [hereinafter Holder Memorandum].
80. “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,” Memorandum
from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department Components
and United States Attorneys (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/
readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf [hereinafter Filip Memorandum]. Unlike its
predecessor memoranda, the Filip Memorandum was incorporated directly into the
United States Attorneys’ Manual as USAM 9-28.100, et seq. Accordingly, throughout
the remainder of this article, citations to the Filip Memorandum are expressed as
citations to the pertinent sections of USAM 9-28.100, et seq.
81. Department officials have issued related guidance, discussed infra § II.A.2.a.3,
concerning the criteria for the selection and use of monitors in resolution agreements.
82. See Breuer Testimony, supra note 27 (discussing generally the DOJ’s goals of
deterrence and rehabilitation with respect to corporate misconduct and noting that as
part of a resolution agreement, the DOJ may require that corporations retain
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A. Corporate Resolution Mechanisms
1. Historical Overview
As demonstrated in several cases, most notably, the prosecution of
Arthur Andersen LLP by the DOJ Criminal Division’s Enron Task
Force, the decision to charge a business organization with criminal
violations can have profound and irreparable adverse consequences.83 A
company or firm in a highly regulated industry can be thrust into a
tailspin resulting in its demise by mandatory or permissive exclusions
from publicly-funded programs or revocation or rescission of licenses or
contracts, or through disqualification from future procurements. In the
wake of a criminal conviction, moreover, an organization competing in
any sector will face a very real prospect of loss of customers and key
employees. Hence, the decision to charge business organizations with
criminal misconduct is among the most complex determinations a
prosecutor may face.
While the prosecution of business organizations in the United
States dates back to 1909,84 the Holder Memorandum was the first
formal guidance issued by the DOJ. It set forth certain considerations or
principles regarding a decision to criminally charge a business
organization:85
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk
of harm to the public;
2. the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the corporation;
3. the corporation’s history of similar conduct;

“independent compliance monitors in appropriate cases”). See also Prepared remarks to
Compliance Week 2010 – 5th Annual Conference for Corporate Financial, Legal, Risk,
Audit & Compliance Officers (May 26, 2010) (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant
Attorney Gen.).
83. See, e.g., P.J. Meitle, Who’s the Boss? Prosecutorial Involvement in Corporate
America, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 2, 4-5 (2007); Leonard Orland, The Transformation of
Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45, 52-53 (2007); F.
Joseph Warin, Peter E. Jaffe, The Deferred Prosecution Jigsaw Puzzle: A Modest
Proposal for Reform, 19 Andrews Litigation Rep. 1 (Sept. 2005); Greenblum, supra
note 6, at 1865-69.
84. New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
85. Holder Memorandum, supra note 79.
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4. the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation;
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance
program;
6. the corporation’s remedial actions;
7. the collateral consequences, including disproportionate
harm to shareholders and others; and
8. the adequacy of non-criminal remedies.86
These principles and supporting commentary have evolved through
a series of memoranda drafted by successive administrations,
culminating in the Filip Memorandum.87
86.
87.

See id. at 2-3.
Briefly, then-Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson issued a
superseding memorandum on January 20, 2003. Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations, Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney
General, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20,
2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (last
visited Jan. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum]. The Thompson
Memorandum added another consideration to the Holder Memorandum: the adequacy
of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the organization’s malfeasance. See
Thompson Memorandum, at 3. It also observed that in evaluating the adequacy of the
corporation’s cooperation in the investigation, the prosecutor could consider whether
the corporation was willing to waive the attorney-client and work product privilege. See
Thompson Memorandum, at 5. The suggestion that a corporation may waive its
attorney-client and work product privileges in order to avoid indictment proved to be
controversial. Mark J. Stein & Joshua A. Levine, The Filip Memorandum: Does It Go
Far Enough?, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Sept. 11, 2008); see also United States. v. Stein,
435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
On December 12, 2006 then-Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty issued
yet another revision of the “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations” that superseded the Thompson Memorandum. Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations, Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy
Attorney General, to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys
(Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/
mcnulty_memo.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum].
The McNulty Memorandum attempted to limit a prosecutor’s ability to request
a waiver of the corporation’s attorney-client or work product privileges and removed
the waiver of these protections from the list of factors that U.S. Attorneys should
consider when deciding whether to charge an organization. Compare Thompson
Memorandum, Principle II, Factor No. 4 with McNulty Memorandum, Principle III,
Factor No. 4. The McNulty Memorandum also modified one of the previously
articulated principles; specifically, it provided that a prosecutor should only consider
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The Filip Memorandum acknowledges, but rejects, the popular
understanding that cooperation impliedly meant waiving the
corporation’s attorney-client privilege or attorney work product
protection.88 Instead, it clarifies that the mitigating cooperation credit
central to the prosecutive analysis, which ranges in outcome along a
spectrum from prosecution to declining prosecution, turns on a target
corporation’s willingness to disclose facts relevant to the government’s
inquiry.89 This disclosure, in turn, entails consideration of whether the
corporation decides to pay the legal fees of its officers or employees
who are implicated in the government’s investigation or whether it
participates in a joint defense agreement.90 In this vein, the Filip
Memorandum acknowledges the utility of NPAs and deferred
prosecution agreements DPAs as a middle ground that balances the
collateral consequences of prosecuting corporations—harm to innocent
third parties (employees, vendors and shareholders who knew nothing of
the alleged misconduct), harm to the communities in which the
corporation operates, and risk to economic markets, to name but a few—
against the likelihood of obtaining restitution, rehabilitating the
corporation and engendering respect for the law and trust and
confidence in enforcement authorities. At the same time, NPAs and
DPAs preserve the government’s ability to prosecute noncompliant
corporations that, nonetheless, materially breach the resolution
agreement.91
2. NPAs
As its name suggests, a NPA memorializes the government’s
agreement not to prosecute a target corporation for violations of federal

pre-existing compliance programs in deciding whether to bring criminal charges against
a corporation.
88. Filip Memorandum, supra note 80.
89. Id. While significant for its stance against compulsory waiver, some criticize
that the Filip Memorandum does not go far enough, appearing to suggest grades of
protected information and forbidding requests for “core” privileged material, while
saying nothing of “non-core” privileged materials, which may remain subject to
prosecutors’ requests. See Stein & Levine, supra note 87.
90. See USAM 9-28.730 n.6.
91. See id. at 9-28.1000
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law.92A NPA is an appropriate resolution mechanism only when other
means of obtaining cooperation are unavailable or would be ineffective,
and the company’s cooperation is needed to advance the public’s
interest.93 Before offering a business organization a NPA, prosecutors
are expected to consider the significance of the investigation or
prosecution to a law enforcement program, the value and history of the
company’s cooperation to the investigation or prosecution, and the
organization’s culpability and criminal record.94 The prosecutor’s
supervisor must approve a NPA.95 Multi-district NPAs require the
approval of each implicated USAO.96
NPAs must be drafted carefully and with particularity, limiting
their scope to the specific offenses committed.97 A properly drafted NPA
“leaves no doubt as to the obligations of the parties to the agreement.”98
3. DPAs
Akin to NPAs, DPAs memorialize the government’s agreement to
defer prosecution of a defendant for a certain temporal period,
contingent on the corporate defendant’s fulfillment of a litany of
commitments and obligations.99 In contrast to a NPA, a DPA is
predicated on a charging document—typically a Criminal
Information100—and often an uncontested Statement of Facts, both of
which are filed with the court.101 The Statement of Facts is sufficiently
92. See USAM 9-27.600(A) and (B)(1)(d). Thompson Memorandum, supra note
87, at 5. Unlike DPAs, NPAs are not predicated upon the filing of a formal charging
document and the court is not involved. See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford,
Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t. Components,
U.S. Attorneys 1 n. 2 (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morforduseofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [hereinafter Morford Memorandum].
93. See USAM 9-27.600(B)(2)-(4).
94. See id. at 9-27.620(A), 9-27.620 (B)(3), 9-28-1000(B).
95. Id. at 9-27.600(B)(4).
96. Id. at 9-27.641(A).
97. See id. at 9-27.630(A)(1)-(2).
98. Id. at 9-27.650 (B).
99. The Speedy Trial Act permits courts to defer prosecutions pursuant to written
agreements between the government and the defendant, as a means of allowing the
defendant to exhibit conduct that would excuse the need for prosecution. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(2) (2006).
100. A Criminal Information is filed by the United States Attorney upon a waiver of
a target’s right to be indicted by a Grand Jury.
101. Morford Memorandum, supra note 92, at 1 n.2.
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detailed to demonstrate both that the agreement is beneficial and that the
defendant’s guilt is readily provable. The corporation usually agrees not
to make any public statement that contradicts, or is inconsistent with, the
Statement of Facts.
The prosecution of corporate crimes has long been a high priority
for the Department.102 When warranted, it promotes “critical public
interests,” such as protecting the integrity of the marketplace, market
participants and citizens from misconduct and safeguarding the
environment, to name a few.103 The DOJ advises its attorneys to
consider the shared and common interests of the government and private
businesses. In consideration of these interests, attorneys should conduct
themselves with professionalism, civility and diligence to achieve their
mission and engender the public trust.104 In this regard, the Department
views its role as effectuating positive changes in corporate culture and
detecting, remedying and preventing serious crimes.105
The artificial nature of a corporation is irrelevant in determining
whether it should be prosecuted.106 NPAs and DPAs are now wellaccepted mechanisms for resolving allegations of criminal misconduct
short of convictions.107 They provide a “middle ground between
declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a corporation.”108
The use of NPAs and DPAs is in line with the prosecutor’s broad
discretion to determine “when, whom, how, and even whether to
prosecute [organizations] for violations of federal criminal law.”109
These decisions are applied consistently with the guidance set out in the
Holder Memorandum and in the Filip Memorandum.110 The policy
considerations of an administrative agency affected by the company’s
misconduct may also be relevant. These may include, in certain
circumstances, the corporation’s pre-indictment conduct, e.g., voluntary
disclosure, cooperation, remediation or restitution,111 as well as whether
the organization faces other regulatory sanctions based on the same
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See USAM 9-28.100.
Id.
See id; cf. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 87, at 2.
See USAM 9-28.200(A).
See id.
See id. at 9-28.200 (B).
See id.
Id. at 9-28.300(B).
Id. at 9-28.300(A); see also id. at 9-28.400-28.1100.
See id. at 9-28.400(B).

324

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

operative facts, such as suspension or debarment from participating in a
federal program.112
Perhaps the most significant of these considerations is the
corporation’s cooperation. As the USAM recognizes:
[C]ooperation can be a favorable course for both the government and
the corporation. Cooperation benefits the government—and
ultimately shareholders, employees, and other often blameless
victims—by allowing prosecutors and federal agents, for example, to
avoid protracted delays, which compromise their ability to quickly
uncover and address the full extent of widespread corporate crimes.
With cooperation by the corporation, the government may be able to
reduce tangible losses, limit damage to reputation, and preserve
assets for restitution. At the same time, cooperation may benefit the
corporation by enabling the government to focus its investigative
resources in a manner that will not unduly disrupt the corporation’s
legitimate business operations. In addition, and critically,
cooperation may benefit the corporation by presenting it with the
113
opportunity to earn credit for its efforts.

112.
113.

See id. at 9-28.1000.
Id. at 9-28.700(B). The DOJ does not require waiver of the attorney-client
privilege or attorney work product protection as a condition or factor necessary for a
corporation to be viewed as cooperative, although this was not always the case. See id.
at 9-28.710.
Over the past decade, many commentators and scholars have criticized the
Department, suggesting that its policies, either in practice or perception, wittingly or
not, have been developed and applied in such a way to coerce business organizations
into waiving evidentiary protections such as the attorney-client privilege or attorney
work product doctrine. Id.; see also George A. Stamboulidis & Lauren J. Resnick, Dos
and Don’ts for Managing a Monitor: Worried That a Compliance Issue May Result in a
Government-Imposed Monitor in Your Midst? Be Proactive to Help . . ., 33 DIRS. &
BDS. 1, 36, Sept. 22, 2008; John Pacenti, Wielding Sticks When Carrots Would Do,
MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV. Vol. 82, Issue 164 (Feb. 4, 2008); Earl J. Silbert and Demme
Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of Corporate
Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225 (2006); Mary
Jo White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, Practicing Law
Institute, 1517 PLI Corp. 815, 818 (Nov. 2005); David B. Oitofsky,
Monitor/Examiner’s Role Under Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 234 N.Y.L.J. 4,
col. 4, Sept. 14, 2005. Affirming the sanctity of the evidentiary privileges in question,
the DOJ has now made clear that what is needed to advance the Department’s mission
is not a waiver of its protections, but the factual predicate of the misconduct under
investigation, which the organization is often in a unique position to know. USAM 928.710. At bottom, “prosecutors should not ask for such waivers and are directed not to
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Cooperation does not guarantee any particular level of leniency.114
However, certain government agencies and departments, such as the
SEC and the EPA “have formal voluntary disclosure programs in which
self-reporting, coupled with remediation and additional criteria, may
qualify the corporation for amnesty or reduced sanctions.”115 The DOJ’s
Antitrust Division, for instance, extends amnesty only to the first
corporation to voluntarily report unlawful price-fixing.116
The organization’s operational realities dictate the scope of the
resolution agreement, which in the case of national or multi-national
organizations, requires multi-district approval and perhaps the approval,
or assistance and cooperation, of foreign enforcement officials.117 Key
components of the resolution agreement include terms designed to
punish and deter the recurrence of the offense, rehabilitate the
organization and ensure compliance with the agreement.118 To these
ends, the company typically agrees to:
 fully cooperate, including the timely disclosure of relevant
facts;119
 comply with all provisions of the NPA/DPA and all statutes and
regulations applying to the corporation’s business;
 pay a fine;
 establish/continue a comprehensive compliance program;120
 draft and adopt certain policies and procedures;
 in the case of a DPA, not contradict an agreed upon Statement of
Facts;
 waive defenses; and
 retain a monitor.121
do so. The critical factor is whether the corporation has provided the facts about the
events, as explained further herein.” Id.
“Accordingly, a corporation should receive the same credit for disclosing facts
contained in materials that are not protected by the attorney-client privilege or attorney
work product as it would for disclosing identical facts contained in materials that are so
protected.” USAM 9-28.720.
114. Id. at 9-28.740.
115. See id. at 9-28.750; see also infra §§ (II)(A)(2)(b) & (d).
116. USAM 9-28.750; cf. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 87, Principle VI;
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 87, Principle VII.
117. USAM 9-28.1000 (B) n.8.
118. See id. at 9-28.1300 (A); Morford Memorandum, supra note 92, at 1 n.2.
119. See USAM 9-28.720.
120. See id. at 9-28.800.
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B. The Charter and Selection of a Monitor
Over the past decade, with varying degrees of success, the DOJ and
the companies involved have grappled with the challenges of defining
and adhering to the scope and duration of a monitor’s responsibilities.
Additional quandries have included creating a mechanism for resolving
disagreements between a monitor and an organization, and ensuring that
the selection process is free of conflicts of interest, instills public
confidence and results in the retention of a monitor who is both qualified
and well-respected. Partly in response to some high profile monitorships
involving perceived conflicts of interest, “scope creep” and excessive
fees, on March 7, 2008, the DOJ, through the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General, released a Memorandum to Heads of Department
Components and United States Attorneys authored by then-Acting
Deputy Attorney General Craig S. Morford (the “Morford
Memorandum”) to “present a series of principles for drafting provisions
pertaining to the use of monitors in connection with deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements” with business
organizations.122 The Morford Memorandum sets forth the following
guiding principles for the DOJ and U.S. Attorneys to follow in crafting
monitorships and selecting monitors:
1. prior to selection, the government and company should
address the qualifications desired of a monitor, in light of
the circumstances, in order to select someone who is highly
qualified, well respected and free of conflicts of interest and
to instill public confidence in the selection process;123
2. the monitor must be independent; she is neither an
employee of the organization nor of the government;124
3. the primary charge of the monitor should be to “assess and
monitor a corporation’s compliance” with the terms of the
NPA or DPA that are “specifically designed to address and

121. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Willbros Grp.,
Inc., et al., No. 4:08-cr-00287, (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008) [hereinafter Willbros Deferred
Prosecution Agreement]; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Technip
S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010) [hereinafter Technip Deferred
Prosecution Agreement].
122. See Morford Memorandum, supra note 92, at 2.
123. Id. at Principle 1.
124. Id. at Principle 2.
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reduce the risk of recurrence of the corporation’s
misconduct;”125
4. in furtherance of this charge, the monitor needs to
“understand the full scope of the corporation’s
misconduct,” but should constrain her work and the
discharge of her responsibilities accordingly;126
5. provide periodic reports assessing the corporation’s
compliance with the terms of the DPA and the monitor’s
recommendations;127
6. require the monitor to identify and report new or previously
undisclosed misconduct of the corporation;128
7. the duration of the DPA and the monitorship should be
tailored to the specific problems of the corporation to be
monitored;129 and
8. the DPA should provide for extensions or early
terminations of the monitorship under appropriate
circumstances.130
On May 25, 2010, the DOJ, through then-Acting Deputy Attorney
General Gary G. Grindler, issued a new Memorandum to Heads of
Department Components and United States Attorneys (the “Grindler
Memorandum”) that supplemented the Morford principles.131 The
Grindler Memorandum adds an additional element favoring the
inclusion of a provision in resolution agreements involving the
appointment of a monitor that clarifies the role the DOJ may play in
resolving disputes between the corporation and the monitor.132 The
Grindler Memorandum observes that the Department’s role in resolving
these disputes should be limited to “questions relating to whether the

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at Principle 3.
Id. at Principle 4.
Id. at Principle 5.
Id. at Principle 7.
Id. at Principle 8.
Id. at Principle 9.
Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Attorney General,
“Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and
Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations,” § I, (May 25, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00166.htm
[hereinafter Grindler Memorandum].
132. Id.
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company has complied with the terms of the agreement.”133 It includes
two model provisions for reference by federal prosecutors.134
iii. Case Studies
As previously noted, between 1993 and 2009, the DOJ negotiated
over 140 corporate NPAs and DPAs.135 As the Department’s guidance
has evolved during that time, so too have the terms of the resolution
agreements.136 Two recent DPAs entered in the Southern District of
Texas are illustrative of current practices in federal corporate
investigations.
A. United States v. Willbros Group, Inc.
An epicenter of the energy sector in the United States, the Southern
District of Texas is home to a number of multi-national oil and gas
corporations and the District’s prosecutors and enforcement officials
have developed a heightened sensitivity to compliance with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended.137 The FCPA contains,

133.
134.

Id. § II.
An organization’s performance obligations under the terms of a resolution
agreement may also implicate the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine in unique ways that test the bounds of the organizations’ protections against
the compelled disclosure of sensitive information. The USAM cautions prosecutors that
organizations are encouraged to report perceived violations of these well-settled
protections, which the Department may separately investigate and, where appropriate,
discipline its attorneys. See USAM 9-28.760.
135. See Corporate Crime: Preliminary Observations on DOJ’s Use and Oversight
of Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, Government Accountability Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d09636t.pdf.
136. For in depth discussions of key features of select DPAs, see, e.g., Matt Senko,
Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 19 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 163 (2009); Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1744-55; Bohrer &
Trencher, supra note 35, at 1492-94, 1500-02; Warin & Jaffe, supra note 83;
Greenblum, supra note 6, at 1871-80, 89-94.
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (2006). Since 1998, the DOJ increasingly has used NPAs
and DPAs to resolve corporate violations of the FCPA. See Response of the United
States Questions Concerning Phase 3 OECD Working Group on Bribery, Appendix B –
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among other elements, anti-bribery provisions designed to combat
corrupt payments to foreign officials in exchange for preferential
treatment in business dealings.138
In the case of Willbros Group, Inc. and Willbros International, Inc.
(collectively, “Willbros”), the DOJ brought charges, between 2006 and
2008, against Willbros, a provider of construction and engineeringrelated services to the oil and gas industry, and three of its former
executives, for violating the FCPA.139 Following a series of
investigations, the DOJ found Willbros to be in violation of FCPA’s
anti-bribery provisions in relation to separate transactions between the
Willbros, Nigerian government officials and officials of Ecuador’s staterun petroleum company involving contracts in connection with the
replacement of pipelines and other projects in those countries.140 In
addition, Willbros was found to have engaged in a tax fraud scheme in
Bolivia, through which the Company wired funds to fraudulently claim
Bolivian state tax credits. 141
Executed in May 2008, the DPA negotiated with Willbros Group,
Inc. and Willbros International, Inc. emphasized Willbros’ voluntary
and full cooperation throughout the inquiry.142 Most notably, it
highlighted the internal investigation conducted by the Audit Committee
of the Board of Directors, the voluntary disclosure of the findings, and
conclusions thereof, and the companies’ limited waiver of the attorneyclient privilege as to the DOJ.143 As part of the negotiated resolution,
Willbros agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $22 million,144 continue its
implementation of a corporate compliance and ethics program, refine its
internal controls and policies to enhance FCPA compliance and engage
Chart 5, “Sanctions Imposed Upon Legal Persons for FCPA Violations Since 1998”
(May 3, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3-appx-b.pdf.
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1.
139. See Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, Attachment A,
Statement of Facts; Press Release, Department of Justice, Former Willbros International
Consultant Pleads Guilty to $6 Million Foreign Bribery Scheme (Nov. 12, 2009) (on
file with author), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
conewsstory&tkr=WG:US&sid=aNgHsMsp4qmI.
140. See Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, Attachment A,
Statement of Facts.
141. See id.
142. Id. ¶ 5.
143. Id. ¶¶ 5(a)-(e).
144. Id. ¶ 7.

330

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

a corporate monitor.145 Among other things, the DPA described the
mechanism by which the company would propose monitor candidates
for the DOJ’s acceptance, the required qualifications of the monitor and
the monitor’s term of engagement.146 Moreover, the DPA incorporated,
by reference, Attachment D, which explained “the Monitor’s duties and
authority, and the obligations of [the company] with respect to the
Monitor and the Department.”147 The document detailing the scope of
the Monitor’s authority included a mechanism by which the company
could withhold from the Monitor documents and information on the
grounds of evidentiary protections, such as the attorney-client privilege
or attorney work product doctrine, with prompt notice to the Monitor
and the DOJ.148 The DPA, however, allowed the DOJ to consider the
company’s decision to withhold such information in determining
whether it had fully cooperated with the Department under the
agreement.149

145.
146.
147.

Id. ¶¶ 10-12.
Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
Id. ¶ 13. Under the Willbros DPA, the monitor’s term was three years, which
the DOJ could extend for an additional one-year period. See Willbros Defered
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, Attachment D, ¶¶ 1, 3. Willbros was
empowered to propose monitor candidates for the DOJ’s approval. The Monitor
candidates had to have FCPA expertise; experience designing and implementing
compliance programs and policies and procedures; the ability to access and deploy
resources as necessary and appropriate to discharge her duties; and independence from
Willbros. Id. ¶ 1(a)-(d). The monitor was required to issue three reports to the DOJ after
preparing in advance of each report a workplan that was subject to comment from both
Willbros and the DOJ. Id. ¶ 7(e). The initial report was required to be filed within 120
days of the monitor’s retention, and the two follow-up reports were to be issued at one
year intervals thereafter. The reports were to be served contemporaneously on the DOJ
and Willbros. Id. Within sixty days of receipt of the monitor’s report, Willbros was
required to object in writing to any of the monitor’s recommendations it found
impracticable with an alternative proposal or, within 120 days, adopt and implement the
monitor’s recommendations. Id. ¶ 7(e)(iii). To the extent Willbros disagreed with the
monitor’s recommendation, the Department would consider its written response and
alternative proposal in determining whether Willbros had fully complied with the terms
of the DPA. Id. If the monitor uncovered a suspected or actual violation of law, the
DPA empowered her to report the matter to Willbros’ General Counsel, Audit
Committee and its outside counsel for investigation or, if warranted, directly to the
DOJ. Id. ¶ 9. If the monitor reported such a matter to the company, Willbros was, in
turn, required to disclose the matter to the Department within ten days. Id.
148. Id. ¶ 6(b).
149. Id. ¶ 6(a).
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B. United States v. Technip S.A.
Similarly, between 2009 and 2010 the DOJ charged Technip, S.A.
(“Technip”), a French company that provides engineering, procurement
and construction services to the oil and gas industry, and several of its
senior level employees, with violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery
provisions; the charges stemmed from the Company’s payment of bribes
to Nigerian officials to obtain contracts for the design and development
of a liquefied natural gas plant.150 On June 28, 2010, the Criminal
Division, Fraud Section of the DOJ resolved two counts of alleged
violations of the FCPA involving Technip.151 The charges against
Technip were premised on its purported participation in a conspiracy by
which a Technip-affiliated joint venture, of which it was a part, was
claimed to have bribed high-level foreign officials in an effort to secure
engineering contracts in connection with the development of a liquefied
natural gas plant in Nigeria.152
In broad strokes, the DPA required Technip’s continued
cooperation with the Government, payment of a monetary penalty of
$240 million and the engagement of a corporate monitor with an initial
two-year and seven day term, subject to an extension of up to one
year.153 The DPA recognized that Technip had “fully cooperated in the
investigation and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative
150. See Technip Deffered Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, Attachment A,
Statement of Facts.
151. Id. at attachment A, ¶ 1. While the French government was not a party to the
agreement, the DPA is notable for its requirement that the monitor review and report on
Tecnhip’s compliance with both American and French anti-corruption laws and report
suspected or actual violations to the appropriate sovereign authority. Just as sovereign
powers are increasingly cooperating in the investigation and resolution of anticorruption laws, domestically, federal and state governments are collaborating in
corporate investigations. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v.
WellCare Health Plans, Inc., No. 8:09-cr-00203, (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2009), http://www.
wellcare.com/WCAssets/corporate/assets/00_dpa_complete.pdf. (DPA between the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida, the Florida Attorney
General’s Office and Wellcare Health Plans Inc., and its Affiliates and Subsidiaries).
One of the authors of this article, Mr. O’Neil, was appointed Senior Vice President,
General Counsel and Secretary of WellCare in April 2008, after the investigation of the
Company became public. He executed the DPA on behalf of WellCare and was later
named Executive Vice Chairman.
152. Id. ¶¶ 2-22.
153. See Technip Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 121, ¶¶ 3,11.
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acceptance of responsibility for criminal conduct,” for which it received
a two-point credit in the calculation of its culpability score.154 It also
described Technip’s obligation to continue its implementation and
refinement of a corporate compliance and ethics program, as well as to
conduct a review of its internal controls, policies and procedures in an
effort to bolster FCPA compliance.155
To assist the company with these obligations, the DPA included a
document detailing the mechanism by which the Company would
propose and retain the monitor, as well as the scope of the monitor’s
duties.156 The DPA was required to be attached to and incorporated into
the retention agreement between Technip and the Monitor.157
Furthermore, the “parties agree[d] that the Monitor is an independent
third-party, not an employee or agent of [Technip] or the Department,
and that no attorney-client relationship shall be formed between Technip
and the Monitor.”158 The DPA described the process and frequency by
which the Monitor would conduct reviews and issue reports,159 required
the Monitor to develop a work plan subject to the parties’ review and

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. ¶ 6(C).
Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
Id. ¶ 10. The monitor’s term was two years. Id. at Attachment D ¶ 2.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5(a).
Id. ¶¶ 6-11. In advance of each report, the Monitor was required to submit a
workplan that was subject to review and comment by Technip and the Department, but
the Monitor was empowered to resolve any disagreement with Technip or the
Department relating to the workplan. Id. ¶ 6. The Monitor’s first report was due within
120 days of her engagement, and it was to be served simultaneously on Technip and the
Department. Id. ¶ 7. The Monitor was then required to issue two follow-up reports. Id. ¶
9. Within sixty days of receipt of one of the Monitor’s reports, Technip was required to
object, in writing, to any recommendation it considered impracticable; if not, Technip
was to adopt and implement the Monitor’s recommendations within 120 days of receipt
of the report. Id. ¶ 8. In the event of a disagreement concerning one of the Monitor’s
recommendations, Technip and the Monitor were to seek guidance from French
authorities in an effort to resolve the dispute. Ultimately, however, the Monitor’s
decision was binding as to whether Technip should adopt her, or an alternative,
proposal. Id. ¶ 8. In the event the Monitor uncovered suspected or actual violations of
law, the DPA empowered her to refer the matter to Technip’s Ethics and Compliance
Committee, Ethics and Governance Committee and Technip’s Chairman, and
recommend that Technip pursue an investigation. Id. ¶ 11. If Technip failed to report
the matter to French authorities or the Department, the Monitor was empowered to do
so. Id.
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comment prior to commencing its work,160 and described a mechanism
through which future violations would be referred to the company’s
ethics and compliance committee for further investigation or reporting
to the Government at the direction of the Monitor.161
b. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission
i. Regulatory Initiatives
In 2002, Congress formalized the SEC’s power to seek equitable
relief when settling securities enforcement actions. Enacted in the wake
of a series of cataclysmic corporate scandals, SOX might be more
appropriately referred to as “the Enron/WorldCom Response Act.”162
While the Enron demise triggered the initiative, “it took the WorldCom
collapse to bring it to fruition.”163 Section 305(b) of SOX amended the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) to add that “[i]n any
action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under any
provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any
Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or
necessary for the benefit of investors.”164 This express legislative
authorization buttressed long-standing statutory provisions and judicial
decisions construing and applying them.165 Under the 1934 Act and the
1933 Securities Act (the “1933 Act”), the Commission, through its
Enforcement Division, was authorized to initiate civil, administrative,
and cease-and-desist actions seeking, inter alia,166 permanent and
temporary injunctions, money damages, and orders prohibiting
individuals from participating in the offering of stocks.167 In connection
with cease-and-desist orders, both the 1933 and 1934 Acts authorized
the SEC to ensure ongoing compliance with federal securities laws:

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 11.
Harold S. Bloomenthal, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE § 1:1 (2010).
Id.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-204, Title III, §305(b), 116 Stat.
745 (July 30, 2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2006)).
165. James Fanto, Directors’ & Officers’ Liability, PLIREF-DIRLIAB § 7:5.4 at *745 (2011).
166. 1934 Act § 21; 1933 Act § 8A.
167. 1934 Act § 21; 1933 Act § 8A.
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Such order may, in addition to requiring a person to cease and desist
from committing or causing a violation, require such person to
comply, or to take steps to effect compliance, with such provision,
rule, or regulation, upon such terms and conditions and within such
time as the Commission may specify in such order. Any such order
may, as the Commission deems appropriate, require future
compliance or steps to effect future compliance, either permanently
or for such period of time as the Commission may specify, with such
provision, rule, or regulation with respect to any security, any issuer,
168
or any other person.

Hence, long before the advent of SOX, the SEC had asserted
authority to ensure continuing compliance with its regulations, rules and
enforcement policies.169
As far back as the 1960s, the SEC was imposing outside
receiverships on corporations as part of its enforcement actions.170 At
first, the Commission’s primary goal was to ensure the preservation of
assets whenever fraud or waste seemed likely. Soon, however, outside
receivers were tasked with ensuring long-term compliance with federal
securities laws and regulations.171 In cases in which securities laws had
been willfully violated but receivers were unnecessary, the duty to
ensure compliance was delegated to independent directors, special
counsel, or outside advisors appointed pursuant to settlement
agreements.172 These individuals, often in conjunction with courtappointed directors, served a remedial function that presaged modernday independent consultants and monitors.
Against this backdrop, in 1994, a corporate monitor with an
unprecedented mandate was appointed in the landmark Prudential

168.
169.

1933 Act § 8A(a); 1934 Act § 21C(a).
Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 684-86; see also Khanna & Dickinson, supra
note 3, at 1717 (citing BellSouth Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 45,279, 2002 WL
47 167 (Jan. 15, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-45279; Chiquita Brands
Int’I Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 44,902, 75 SEC Docket 2308 (Oct. 3, 2001); Am.
Bank Note Holographies, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7994, Exchange Act Release
No. 44,563, 75 SEC Docket 912 (July 18, 2001); KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange
Act Release No. 44,050, 74 SEC Docket 1351 (Mar. 8, 2001); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 43,761, 73 SEC Docket 2987 (Dec. 21, 2000).
170. Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 684.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 685.
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Securities case,173 which involved an investigation of alleged securities
fraud arising in the sale of oil and gas limited partnerships. Prudential’s
counsel and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District
of New York negotiated a DPA through a series of meetings and
letters.174 Among other things, defense counsel argued that criminal
prosecution was unnecessary and proposed the imposition of an outside
monitor at the company’s expense.175 The DPA reinforced the settlement
Prudential had already reached with the SEC by requiring the company
to “retain a mutually acceptable outside counsel within 30 days of the
filing of this Agreement to review [Prudential’s] policies and procedures
in order to ensure that [Prudential] has adopted all of the compliancerelated directives” mandated by the SEC.176 Thereafter, both agencies
began requiring the appointment of independent monitors in connection
with the resolutions of their investigations.177 With the passage of SOX,
the SEC gained Congressional approval of the agreements first
pioneered in Prudential Securities and implemented by courts
repeatedly in similar cases that followed.178
In February 2009, the Commission announced that Robert S.
Khuzami, a former federal prosecutor who had served as the Chief of
the Securities and Commodities Fraud Task Force of the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, had been
named the Director of the Division of Enforcement (the “Division”).179
Under Mr. Khuzami’s leadership, the Division undertook a “rigorous
173. See SEC v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 93 Civ. 2164, 1993 WL 473189, at *2-3
(D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1993); see also Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1717 (citing
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United Stales v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 94-2189
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1994)).
174. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1717-18.
175. See Correspondence between the United States Department of Justice and
Prudential Securities Inc. dated October 27, 1994 and October 13, 1994 (advocating for,
and memorializing, terms of a deferred prosecution agreement), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/prudential.pdf (last visited Sept. 30,
2011. See also Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1717-18 (citing Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 94-2189 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 27, 1994)).
176. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc.,
No. 94-2189 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1994).
177. Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1718.
178. Id.
179. See Press Release, SEC, Robert Khuzami Named SEC Director of Enforcement
(Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-31.htm.
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self-assessment” as part of its effort to become stronger, more swift and
strategic in its enforcement initiatives and priorities.180 Less than a year
after his appointment, on January 13, 2010, Mr. Khuzami held a press
conference to announce five new specialized enforcement units, along
with an arsenal of new investigative tools, including the empowerment
of senior staff to issue subpoenas and the introduction of cooperation
agreements and non- and deferred prosecution agreements.181 Mr.
Khuzami’s announcement expressed unequivocally the Division’s
intention to create concrete, meaningful incentives for individuals or
companies with knowledge of securities fraud or other violations to selfreport in a timely fashion and fully cooperate thereafter.182 This initiative
appears to signal the beginning of a new phase in SEC enforcement
efforts in which the Commission expects greater self-monitoring by
corporations.
In December 2010, following prompt and extensive self-reporting,
the Commission entered into its first unilateral NPA with Carter’s Inc., a
children’s clothing retailer.183 Carter’s Inc. discovered that a now-former
executive had perpetrated a scheme of financial fraud against it, which
caused the company to overstate its income for a period of five years
preceding the agreement, while the former executive used inside
information to exercise stock options worth more than $4 million.184
Once the executive’s conduct was discovered, the Audit Committee of
Carter’s Inc.’s Board of Directors, with the assistance of outside
counsel, conducted a thorough internal investigation and promptly selfreported its findings to the Commission, and took remedial measures
and cooperated extensively with the Commission’s own investigation,

180. Robert Khuzami, Remarks at News Conference Announcing Enforcement
Cooperation Initiative and New Senior Leaders (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.sec.gov
/news/speech/2010/spch011310rsk.htm [hereinafter Khuzami Speech].
181. Id.
182. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals
and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm [hereinafter SEC Cooperation
Initiative Press Release]; Khuzami Speech, supra note 180.
183. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Carter’s Executive with Fraud
and Insider Trading SEC (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010252.htm [hereinafter SEC Charges Former Carter’s Executive].
184. Complaint, SEC v. Elles, No. 1:10-cv-4118 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2010); see SEC
Charges Former Carter’s Executive, supra note 183.
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for which the company “received the benefits of a non-prosecution
agreement.”185
Continuing on this trajectory, in May 2011, the SEC executed its
first unilateral DPA with Tenaris, S.A.186 This agreement resolved
allegations that Tenaris had violated the FCPA by making payments to
foreign officials and utilizing improper accounting methods from 2006
through 2008 to secure service contracts with the government of
Uzbekistan.187 In March 2009, a customer informed Tenaris that it had
knowledge of improper payments by Tenaris that may have benefited
the third party’s employees.188 In response, the Audit Committee of
Tenaris’s Board of Directors retained outside counsel and conducted an
internal investigation.189 Tenaris disclosed to the Commission and the
DOJ the preliminary findings of its internal investigation, and it pledged
to expand its investigation and share its findings with the
Government.190 A year later, Tenaris’s counsel shared with the SEC and
DOJ the facts learned from its world-wide, detailed internal
investigation, which included the revelation of improper payments to
Uzbekistani officials and accounting for the same, which enabled the
company to secure contracts in Uzbekistan, as well as facts unrelated to
the third-party information that gave rise to the internal investigation
and initial disclosure to the Commission and the DOJ.191 Given the
company’s self-disclosure to, and forthright cooperation with, the SEC,
following an internal investigation by outside counsel to the Audit

185. SEC Charges Former Carter’s Executive, supra note 179. See Non-Prosecution
Agreement between Carter’s Inc. and the SEC, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/cooperation/2010/carters1210.pdf.
186. See Jaclyn Jaeger, SEC Gets into the Non-Prosecution Agreement Act,
COMPLIANCE WEEK, Jan. 25, 2011; Non-Prosecution Agreement between Carter’s Inc.
and the SEC, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/cooperation/2010
/carters1210.pdf.
187. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement between Tenaris, S.A. and the SEC, SEC
(May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. ¶ 6bb. (stating that Tenaris conducted “a world-wide [internal] investigation
of its business operations and controls” and “provided extensive, thorough, real-time
cooperation with the staff of the Division and DOJ which included timely, voluntary
and complete disclosure of certain conduct” to the government).
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Committee of its Board of Directors, Tenaris secured the Commission’s
first-ever DPA.192
The Tenaris DPA requires the company to disgorge approximately
$5.4 million and forgo taxes paid on revenue received from improperly
obtained service contracts; certify to the Commission its compliance
with the terms of the DPA; revamp its Code of Conduct and commit to
annual updates and revisions of the same; require all directors, officers
and management level employees to certify annually compliance with
the Code of Conduct; and effectively train all officers, managers and
employees with financial, accounting or government relations
responsibilities and anyone else within the company involved in
activities that implicate Tenaris’s anti-corruption policies.193 Notably,
Tenaris executed a NPA with the DOJ related to the same alleged facts
that gave rise to the DPA with the Commission.194
Neither the Carter’s Inc. NPA nor the Tenaris DPA required the
companies to retain an independent consultant. As with the DOJ, the
SEC may view incentivizing companies to police themselves – while
simultaneously making examples of non-cooperators – as a more
effective use of its resources than traditional enforcement efforts.195 The
extent and frequency with which the Commission will continue using
NPAs and DPAs remains to be seen, but judging by the DOJ’s use of
such agreements, NPAs are less likely to draw a monitor than are
DPAs.196

192. See id; see also Press Release, SEC, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s
First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news
/press/2011/2011-112.htm.
193. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement between Tenaris, S.A. and the SEC, SEC
(May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112-dpa.pdf (paraphrasing
the terms of Tenaris’s agreement with SEC).
194. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tenaris S.A. Agrees to Pay $3.5
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(May 17, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-crm-629.html.
195. See SEC Cooperation Initiiative Press Release, supra note 182; Khuzami
Speech, supra note 180.
196. Of the DOJ’s ten agreements requiring a monitor in 2010, three were NPAs and
seven were DPAs. See Jaclyn Jaeger, SEC Gets into the Non-Prosecution Agreement
Act, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Jan. 25, 2011.
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ii. Independent Consultants and Monitors
The Division of the SEC pursues civil lawsuits, and quasi-criminal
causes of action and remedies in federal district court and in
administrative proceedings.197 In those proceedings, the Commission
seeks monetary penalties; injunctions, which subject violators to fines or
imprisonment for contempt; disgorgement of illegal profits; and
suspension from service as a corporate officer or director.198 The vast
majority of civil enforcement actions are resolved before trial.199
In the post-SOX era, the SEC has imposed a variety of governance
reforms. Broadly labeled “corporate therapeutics,”200 these initiatives
have ranged in intrusiveness and have included cease-and-desist orders;
new management structures; new compliance positions; new board-level
committees; and new procedures for board-level decision-making.201
Generally, corporate monitors have been reserved for the most egregious
cases, particularly those involving criminal misconduct and jointly
prosecuted by the DOJ.202
The Commission has often required the appointment of
independent consultants. They have been empowered to conduct
investigations into compliance practices, to report their findings to the
SEC, and to make recommendations for future compliance programs.203
The corporation may not withhold any information from the
Commission based on evidentiary privileges, and it must adopt the
consultant’s recommendation.204 The target company, moreover, cannot
dismiss the consultant without prior approval from the Commission.205
Independent consultants have been praised for their ability to create
a “temporal, structural, and dialogical space” in which stubborn cultural
197. See SEC, About the Division Enforcement, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
enforce/about.htm.
198. See id.
199. See Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 403, 429 (2010) (“The vast majority of the
SEC’s civil enforcement actions result in settlement.”).
200. See Barnard, supra note 6, at 798.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 801 (“Typically . . . full-service monitors are appointed only in cases
involving concurrent criminal charges brought by the Department of Justice.”).
203. Id. at 806-08.
204. Id. at 809.
205. Id.
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and compliance issues can be addressed.206 Settlement agreements have
often provided that the company review all preliminary
recommendations by the consultant before they are finalized, thereby
providing the firm with an opportunity to be heard. In a 2003 case
involving Akorn, Inc., for example, the SEC required the corporation to
engage an independent consultant to review the company’s “material
internal accounting controls, practices, and policies related to accounts
receivable.”207 The consultant was given 180 days to complete its review
and submit a report documenting its findings and recommending
improvements.208 Akorn then had 30 days to review the
recommendations and propose alternate procedures designed to achieve
the same goals.209 The consultant was required to evaluate Akorn’s
proposals and make a final determination on the recommended course of
action.210 Akorn was bound by the consultant’s final decisions and had
to report to the staff of the Commission the decisions made and actions
taken as a result of the consultant’s recommendations.211 Because Akorn
was entitled to comment on the consultant’s findings and propose
alternate methods, the final recommendations could not be made without
a dialogue between the consultant and the company.212
In addition to accounting programs, independent consultants have
been charged with designing policies for:
 foreign payments under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act;
 use and misuse of non-public information;
 travel and entertainment expenses;
 receipt and retention of e-mail communications; and
 pricing policies.213
The SEC views the use of independent consultants as an extension
of its enforcement authority and a way to leverage its limited
enforcement resources.214
206. See Barnard, supra note 6, at 807 (citing Hess & Ford, Corporate Corruption
and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
307, 336 (2008)).
207. Id. (citing In re Akorn, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,546, 2003 SEC
LEXIS 2276, at *13 (Sept. 25, 2003)).
208. In re Akorn, No. 48,546, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2276, at *13-16.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. Barnard, supra note 6, at 808.
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iii. SEC Guidance
The SEC has not enunciated policies or procedures for selecting
and appointing independent consultants or corporate monitors.215
Because corporate monitors are reserved for those cases in which the
DOJ is simultaneously pursuing criminal sanctions, the Morford and
Grindler Memoranda provide the best guidance in joint enforcement
actions.216 In civil cases, the following three criteria have been identified
as crucial to the SEC’s decision to impose an independent consultant:
1. whether better internal controls would have prevented the
incident;
2. the nature and extent of the remedial steps taken by the
company since discovering the matter/problem/concern;
and
3. the pace of the settlement discussions—in protracted
situations, a company has more time to address and rectify
compliance issues, possibly rendering unnecessary the
appointment of an independent consultant.217
If the Commission decides to require the retention of an
independent consultant, a staff lawyer typically drafts the initial
proposed scope of the consultant’s duties and responsibilities. The
parties then negotiate those provisions.218
For their part, companies seek carefully to delineate the charter of
the consultant and retain maximum flexibility in considering and
implementing the consultant’s recommendations.219 Sometimes, the SEC
defers the question of the scope of the consultant’s work to negotiations
between the company and the consultant. In these instances, the SEC
specifies only certain regulatory objectives that the consultant must
achieve, and the parties develop the plan and processes.220
Although the ultimate responsibility for approving the independent
consultant lies with the court, the judiciary has often sought a
214.
215.

See id. at 814-15.
See Barnard, supra note 6, at 798; see generally Press Release, SEC, Statement
from the SEC Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
216. See Grindler Memorandum, supra note 131.
217. Barnard, supra note 6, at 815.
218. See id. at 816-17.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 811.
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recommendation from the Commission following a careful
consideration of the candidates proposed by the target company.221 The
SEC staff interviews the candidate(s) to assess their independence and
perspective on enforcement actions.222 Nominated candidates with the
requisite expertise and background are rarely contested.
From the company’s perspective, the most important elements of an
independent consultant’s charter are the scope of her responsibilities, her
ability to understand the compliance challenges of the industrial sector,
her willingness to consider objectively the company’s realties and, of
course, her fees and expenses.223 At the same time, to be successful, the
consultant must garner the confidence of the SEC staff.224 An evenkeeled temperament with a commitment to fundamental fairness and the
development of a constructive dialogue with the board of directors and
the senior management team are also helpful attributes.225 Quite
appropriately, settlement agreements stipulate that the consultant cannot
do any work for the company for a period of two years following the
consultancy. Consequently, candidates are very particular about which
appointments they accept.226
iv. Case Study: WorldCom, Inc.
Following a voluntary disclosure of egregious accounting
misconduct to the SEC staff and other enforcement agencies, the
Commission filed its initial complaint against WorldCom, Inc. in late
June 2002.227 The SEC charged WorldCom with having inflated its
income by approximately $3.8 billion through an illegal scheme, and the
Staff sought the immediate appointment of a corporate monitor,
injunctive relief, and a civil monetary penalty.228 The initial justification
for the corporate monitor was to “ensure compliance” with any court-

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

O’Hare, supra note 6, at 108.
Barnard, supra note 6, at 820-21.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 823.
SEC, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR INVESTORS REGARDING THE POTENTIAL
DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEC’S CIVIL PENALTY JUDGMENT AGAINST WORLDCOM, INC. IN
THE SEC V. WORLDCOM CASE, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/worldcom/
wcominfo111103.htm.
228. Id.

2012]

ANSWERING TO A HIGHER AUTHORITY

343

ordered evidentiary rulings, protect against spoliation, and prevent overcompensation of WorldCom’s executives.229 Following the entry of a
Rule 21 Order on June 28, 2002, United States District Judge Jed Rakoff
gave the parties five days to submit a roster of proposed corporate
monitors.230 The SEC and WorldCom nominated three individuals and
Judge Rakoff selected Richard C. Breeden, former Chairman of the
SEC.231
Although the initial role of WorldCom’s corporate monitor was
limited to preserving evidence and preventing excessive compensation,
Mr. Breeden’s responsibilities quickly expanded. First, on July 15, 2002,
the court issued an order redefining “compensation” to include not only
payments made to WorldCom executives, but also payments made to
outside advisors, investment bankers, restructuring specialists, and other
consultants.232 On August 1, 2002, Judge Rakoff ordered that he be kept
apprised of “every aspect of the business he deems relevant to his
assessments” in order to facilitate Mr. Breeden’s task in addressing
compensation issues.233 In addition, Judge Rakoff ordered that the
corporate monitor be granted access to all employees and to meetings of
the board of directors and committees thereof.234
On November 26, 2002, WorldCom entered into a partial
settlement with the SEC.235 This resolution did not address civil
penalties, but it cost WorldCom $500 million in cash and $250 million
in stock.236 The settlement authorized Mr. Breeden to undertake a
comprehensive review of WorldCom’s corporate governance standards
and make recommendations to the board for improvements.237 In June
2003, WorldCom agreed to adopt each of Mr. Breeden’s
recommendations.238 This transformation of Mr. Breeden’s mission was

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

O’Hare, supra note 6, at 94.
Id. at 95.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97 (quoting SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14201, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2002)).
234. Id at 97-98.
235. Id. at 98 (citing Judgment of Permanent Injunction Against Defendant
WorldCom, Inc., SEC v. WorldCom, Inc. No 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002)).
236. Id. at 98 n.40.
237. Id at 98.
238. Id. at 98-99
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remarkable and has been the subject of considerable discussion by
scholars and practitioners.239
Even after Mr. Breeden submitted his much-anticipated
recommendations, a 147-page report entitled Restoring Trust, he
continued to play an integral role at the company.240 He determined
compensation packages for WorldCom’s new management team,
attended all board meetings, played a material role in the development
of the company’s monthly budget, participated in the appointment of
new directors, forced at least one shareholder-elected board member to
resign over an alleged conflict of interest, led the talks with the
Government to restore WorldCom’s ability to bid on government
contracts, and ultimately was involved in negotiations with companies
seeking to acquire WorldCom some three years after his appointment.241
Mr. Breeden’s mandate was to be the District Court’s eyes and ears
thereby elevating the monitor’s stature to that of a federal judge.242
Under such circumstances, the company was left without the sort of
recourse now envisioned by the Grindler Memorandum, namely a means
by which the DOJ may play a role in resolving disputes between the
corporation and the monitor.
c. The United States Department of Health and Human Services
i. Regulatory Initiatives
The United States Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) oversees the enforcement of federal health care laws and the
administration of health care programs, including Medicare and
Medicaid.243 HHS is required to work closely with state and local
governments, as many HHS-funded services are provided at the local
level, by state and county agencies, and through private sector grants.244
The OIG, in turn, is responsible for audits, evaluations, investigations,

239. See, e.g., O’Hare, supra note 6, at 99; Hess & Ford, supra note 206; Khanna &
Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1713.
240. O’Hare, supra note 6, at 99.
241. Id. at 101-02.
242. See id. at 103.
243. See About HHS, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/about/ (last visited Feb. 23,
2011).
244. Id.
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and law enforcement efforts related to HHS programs and operations.245
Charged with protecting the integrity of HHS programs, as well as the
health and welfare of the beneficiaries of those programs,246 the OIG is
required to report both to the Secretary of HHS and to Congress
regarding general compliance and management problems within
programs subject to HHS oversight. The OIG must also offer
recommendations regarding correction of any such issues.
In collaboration initially with the Health Care Financing
Administration247 and with reference to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and input from the private health care sector, the OIG has
developed, and continuously updated and refined, segment-specific
compliance program guidance premised on the core elements of an
effective compliance program.248 First published in 1997,249 what
became the “seven elements”250 of a comprehensive health care
compliance program include:
245. Office of the Inspector Gen., HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/open/contacts/oig
.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
246. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 § 2 (1978)
(codified as amended 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-12).
247. In 2001, the Health Care Financing Administration became the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services. See http://www.socialsecurity-disability.org/
glossary/health-care-financing-administration (last visited Jan. 11, 2012); see 68 Fed.
Reg. 23731 (May 5, 2003).
248. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Clinical Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg.
9435 (Mar. 3, 1997); see also OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for
Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4858 (Jan. 31, 2005); OIG Compliance Program Guidance for
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23731 (May 5, 2003); OIG Compliance
Program Guidance for Medicare+Choice Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 61893 (Nov. 15,
1999); OIG Compliance Program Guidance for the Durable Medical Equipment,
Prosthetics, Orthotics and Supply Industry, 64 Fed. Reg. 36368 (July 6, 1999); OIG
Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 63 Fed. Reg. 8987 (Feb. 23, 1998).
249. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Clinical Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg.
9435 (Mar. 3, 1997).
250. The first compliance program guidance, issued in March 1997, identified
eleven elements. 62 Fed. Reg. 9435, 9436 (Mar. 3, 1997). The second compliance
program guidance, issued in February 1998 and addressing hospitals, articulated seven
elements of a “comprehensive compliance program,” 63 Fed. Reg. 8987, 8989 (Feb. 23,
1998), which have been repeated with slight variation in each successive compliance
program guidance that the OIG has issued. See OIG Supplemental Compliance Program
Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4858, 4874 n.83 (Jan. 31, 2005); OIG Compliance
Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23731, 23732-33
(May 5, 2003); OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Medicare+Choice
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1. the designation of a chief compliance officer who reports
directly to the board of directors or other governing body of
the organization, is invested with authority to develop and
oversee a compliance program and is instrumental in the
institution and operation of a management compliance
committee;251
Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 61893, 61896 (Nov. 15, 1999); OIG Compliance Program
Guidance for the Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics and Supply
Industry, 64 Fed. Reg. 36368, 36371 (July 6, 1999).
251. The Sentencing Commission, commenting on the application of the Guidelines,
has long advocated the implementation of “standards and procedures” and the vesting
in a specific “high-level” employee of “overall responsibility” for the organization’s
compliance with them, as two of seven suggested minimum due diligence steps towards
creating an “effective program to prevent and detect violations of law.” See U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8A1.2 App. Note 3(k) (Nov. 1,
1994). Differing slightly from the OIG’s “seven elements,” see U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 1, 2010), the Sentencing Commission did not propose the
“seven minimum steps for a compliance program” for inclusion as an official Guideline
until 2004; they were articulated previously as Application Note 3(k) to §8A1.2. See,
e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8A1.2 App. Note 3(k)
(Nov. 30, 2003). Those “seven minimum steps,” moreover, did not mandate that the
employee charged with oversight of the compliance function have direct access to the
organization’s “governing body”; that requirement came with the elevation of the
Application Note to a Guideline. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES
MANUAL, § 8A1.2 App. Note 3(k) (Nov. 30, 2003) with PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8B2.1(b)(2) (Jan. 13, 2004), http://www.ussc.gov/Legal
/Amendments/Reader-Friendly/20040114_RFP_Amendments.pdf (last visited Jan. 7,
2012), also available at 69 Fed. Reg. 2169 (Jan. 14, 2004),
http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2004/01/14/04-806/sentencing-guidelines-forunited-states-courts (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
There is, then, an apparent corporate governance divergence between the
Guidelines and the OIG Guidance. Unlike the Guidelines, the OIG generally has opined
that the compliance officer should not be subordinate to the organization’s legal or
finance functions. Compare, e.g., 68 Fed. Reg. 23731 n.13 (May 5, 2003) (“The OIG
believes it is generally not advisable for the compliance function to be subordinate to
the [organization’s] general counsel or comptroller or similar financial officer.”), and
64 Fed. Reg. 36368 n.135 (July 6, 1999) (same), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (Nov. 1, 2010) (calling for the delegation of “day-to-day
operational responsibility” for the compliance and ethics program in a specific person
who reports “periodically to high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing
authority” of the organization, or subgroup thereof). The OIG acknowledges, however,
that this suggested corporate governance framework, as with other recommended
elements of an effective compliance program, may not be feasible or appropriate given
the resources available to, or circumstances confronting, all organizations operating in
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2. the development and dissemination of written standards of
conduct and policies and procedures that serve to guide and
foster compliant, ethical behavior;
3. the implementation of a training program;
4. the establishment and maintenance of a hotline to receive
anonymously compliance complaints and concerns;
5. the creation of a framework for responding to reported
incidents of non-compliance and the enforcement of
disciplinary action that explicitly prohibits retaliation;
6. the use of audits and other devices to identify, measure and
address compliance concerns; and
7. a mechanism for investigating and remediating systemic
compliance problems.252
While it is well-settled that the OIG’s compliance program
guidance does not purport to be mandatory,253 if an organization enters
into a corporate integrity agreement, aspects of it will become so; most
notably, by way of example, in virtually every CIA, the OIG requires
the separation of the compliance and legal functions within the C-suite
and a direct reporting line from the chief compliance officer to the
Board of Directors.254
In discharging its enforcement duties, HHS is authorized to levy
both fiscal and exclusionary penalties and does so, typically, through the

the health care sector. See, e.g., 68 Fed. Reg. 23731, 23732. As discussed in notes 25354 and their accompanying text, the OIG’s flexibility in this regard evaporates if an
organization becomes subject to a corporate integrity agreement; the compliance officer
will be required to be independent from the offices of the General Counsel and Chief
Financial Officer.
252. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 8987, 8989 (Feb. 23, 1998) (OIG Compliance Program
Guidance for Hospitals).
253. See 68 Fed. Reg. 23731 (“The contents of this guidance should not be viewed
as mandatory or as an exclusive discussion of the advisable elements of a compliance
program. The document is intended to present voluntary guidance to the industry and
not to represent binding standards for pharmaceutical manufacturers.”); see also id. at
23732.
254. See 64 Fed. Reg. 61893, 61895 n.13 (Nov. 15, 1999) (corporate integrity
agreements “require many of the elements included in this compliance program
guidance”); see, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement Between Office of Inspector Gen.
& Bayer Healthcare, LLC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/
agreements/fully_executed_bayer_cia_112508.pdf (mandating that the “Compliance
Officer not be or be subordinate to the General Counsel or Chief Financial Officer”).
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OIG.255 The sanctions in the OIG’s arsenal include civil monetary
penalties (“CMPs”) and exclusion from participation in federal health
care programs.256 If a health care company is excluded from
participation, it may no longer bill any federal health care program for
services over the period of exclusion.257 The Civil Monetary Penalties
Law (the “CMPL”) grants such authority, as does the Social Security
Act, by reference to many of the provisions of the CMPL.258
A. Corporate Integrity Agreements
OIG often enters into settlement agreements with parties against
whom it has sought or is seeking CMPs and/or exclusion from
participation in federal health care programs.259 While the resolutions
and corresponding compliance obligations often contain common
elements or themes, these resolutions and compliance obligations, over
the past 20 years, have become increasingly sophisticated and holistic.

255. The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. ch. 7, authorizes the Secretary of HHS to
seek civil monetary penalties and assessments (CMPs). See Civil Monetary Penalties
and Affirmative Exclusions, HHS.GOV, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/cmp
/index.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Civil Monetary Penalties]. The Civil
Monetary Penalties Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006), notes additional direct authority
to levy CMPs for a wide variety of conduct that violates federal health care laws. Id.
The OIG is authorized to seek different amounts of civil monetary penalties and
assessments based on the type of violation at issue. 42 CFR § 1003.103 (2009). For
instance, in a case of false or fraudulent claims, OIG may seek a penalty of up to
$10,000 for each item or service improperly claimed, and an assessment of up to three
times the amount improperly claimed. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(B) (2006). In a
kickback case, OIG may seek a penalty of up to $50,000 for each improper act and
damages of up to three times the amount of the remuneration at issue. 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7a(a)(7) (2006).
256. CAROL E. BOWEN, THE LEGAL IMPACT OF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID LEADING
LAWYERS ON THE ROLE OF STATE AND FEDERAL AGENCIES, EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS, AND ENFORCEMENT TRENDS 2009 WL 534744, at *4; Civil Monetary
Penalties, supra note 255.
257. BOWEN, supra note 256, at *4.
258. Id.
259. Civil Monetary Penalties, supra note 255; Sharon Finegan, The False Claims
Act and Corporate Criminal Liability: Qui Tam Actions, Corporate Integrity
Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 625, 651
(2007).
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These resolutions address the target company’s governance, culture, and
specific conduct.260
Compliance expectations and requirements are usually
memorialized in CIAs,261 which include negotiated protocols designed to
ensure a company’s compliance with applicable federal and state
statutes, regulations, and program requirements.262 They typically
require a compliance program to have certain components and
operational features, including board-level oversight. To that end, the
OIG has required, through CIAs, that an organization’s Board of
Directors, or Compliance Committee thereof, retain an independent
health care compliance advisor to assist in the performance of its
compliance program obligations.263 CIAs also generally impose
comprehensive and rigorous periodic certification and reporting
requirements.264
In determining the propriety and scope of a CIA, the OIG will
consider all factors involved in the underlying investigation, including
the misconduct at issue and remedial measures undertaken by the
targeted company.265 Given the oversight powers of HHS over the
industry, as a practical matter, “health care providers have little choice
but to agree to CIAs containing even the most onerous of terms in their
settlement of suits.”266 The ultimate terms and provisions of a CIA are
informed by a number of considerations, including, among others:
 whether the company self-reported the alleged misdeeds;
 any adverse economic impact to a federal health care
program;
 the obligations of a successor-in-interest to the offending
entity;

260. Corporate Integrity Agreements, HHS.GOV, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.asp
(last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
261. Id.; Finegan, supra note 259, at 657.
262. ROBERT FABRIKANT ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: CRIMINAL CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 9.05, (2009).
263. See, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement Between OIG and Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corporation, § III.A.3.c, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 6,
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/Novartis_Pharmaceuticals_Corporation_
09292010.pdf.
264. Id. at §§ III.A.3.c-d.
265. See Finegan, supra note 259, at 658.
266. See id.
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the organization’s continued participation in federal health
care programs or the type of business that fostered the
alleged fraud;
 the likely repetition of the alleged behavior;
 the amount of time that has passed since the conduct
occurred; and
 the existence of an effective compliance program and the
organization’s willingness to implement compliance
measures and certification obligations.267
The presumptive term of a CIA is now five years.268 Some CIAs
have included longer or even indefinite time periods, whereas others
have provided for early termination upon the fulfillment of certain
contingencies or obligations.269
All CIAs require the company to establish a formal compliance
program.270 This will almost always “require the corporation to
implement improved internal controls[,] . . . appoint a compliance
officer, [and] conduct employee training . . . .”271 Key features of CIAmandated compliance programs usually include:
 the appointment of a compliance committee;
 the development of written standards and policies;
 the retention of an Independent Review Organization
(“IRO”);
 the establishment of a confidential disclosure program;
 prohibitions regarding ineligible persons;
 prompt reporting of overpayments and ongoing
investigations/legal proceedings; and
 the creation and submission of comprehensive, certified
implementation and annual reports to OIG.272
CIAs often require the target company to relinquish cognizable
claims to evidentiary privileges or doctrines with respect to legal and

267.
268.

Id.
Corporate Integrity Agreements, supra note 260; Finegan, supra note 259, at

663.
269.
270.
271.
272.

FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 2.
Finegan, supra note 259, at 659; FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 3.
Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 686.
Corporate Integrity Agreements, supra note 260; see also Richard M. Cooper,
The Need for Oversight of Agency Policies for Settling Enforcement Actions, 59 ADMIN.
L. REV. 835, 842 (2007).
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compliance advice the company receives in relation to the CIA and
federal health care programs.273
CIAs also work to ensure that the OIG is aware of fundamental
changes in the subject corporation.274 For instance, in the event of a
divestiture, sale or acquisition, the corporation will be required to notify
the OIG. Furthermore, the CIA is not extinguished by such a transaction
but travels to the new corporate entity.275 CIAs generally require notice
of changes to the corporation’s compliance function, including changes
in the position of Chief Compliance Officer, the composition of the
Compliance Committee, and office status, i.e., whether an office
remains open or has been closed.276
B. Independent Review Organizations
CIAs almost always require the company to retain an IRO to
evaluate and report on the facets of the company’s operations which
were implicated by, or involved in, the allegations or claims that have
been resolved.277 IROs, historically, have been accounting, auditing, or
consulting firms, and typically they are tasked with evaluating and
creating reports regarding the effectiveness of the company’s
compliance program.278
IROs must be independent and, over the years, the OIG has adopted
standards set forth in the Government Auditing Standards of the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to ensure that
independence.279 Among other things, IROs may not perform

273.
274.

FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 3.
See, e.g., Corporate Integrity Agreement Between Office of Inspector Gen. and
Bayer LLC, supra note 254; Corporate Integrity Agreement Between Office of Inspector
Gen. & Eli Lilly & Co., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/
agreements/eli_lilly_and_company_01142009.pdf.
275. Corporate Integrity Agreements, supra note 260; see also FABRIKANT ET AL.,
262 note 263, at 3; Cooper, supra note 272, at 842.
276. Corporate Integrity Agreements, supra note 260; see also FABRIKANT ET AL.,
supra note 262, at 3; Cooper, supra note 272, at 842.
277. Ford & Hess, supra note 3, at 686.
278. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 5.
279. See ALICE G. GOSFIELD, HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK § 7:12 (2009);
GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS: 2010 EXPOSURE DRAFT, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10853g.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
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management functions or make management decisions and should not
audit their own work.280
The OIG has addressed independence in several publications,281 and
in 2010, issued additional guidelines regarding IRO independence.282
Therein, the OIG reiterated that the GAO’s Government Auditing
Standards guide any IRO selection and appointment and noted lists of
services that would and would not impair an IRO’s independence and
280. GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS, supra note 279; see also Gosfield, supra
note 275, § 7:12.
281. For instance, the OIG addressed IRO independence in detail in a 2004
publication titled Frequently Asked Questions Related to IRO Independence. Noting
“the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and an increased focus on issues relating to auditor
independence,” OIG issued a series of “relevant principles” to be used in assessing the
independence of IROs. The following “relevant principles” were among those
discussed:
 Financial Audits: An organization that serves as an entity’s financial auditor
may nonetheless also serve as the entity’s IRO.
 Bookkeeping and Tax Services: An organization that provides bookkeeping
and tax services may also serve as the entity’s IRO, although this depends on
the nature of the bookkeeping and tax services.
 Compliance Review: An organization that conducts a compliance review for
the entity prior to execution of the CIA will generally be allowed to serve as
IRO, unless it has been involved in implementing the recommendations of the
review.
 Training: An organization that has provided general compliance training can
also serve as an IRO. Where, however, the organization has provided general
compliance training on coding and billing, it is unlikely to be sufficiently
independent to serve as an IRO.
 Hotline Operation: An organization that assists an entity in operating its hotline
will generally be able to serve as IRO, unless it has been involved in decisionmaking operations.
 Policies and Procedures: An organization that assists an entity in developing
policies pursuant to the CIA will most likely be prohibited from serving as
IRO.
 Software: An organization that has developed software used by an entity is
likely to be precluded from serving as the entity’s IRO, unless the entity has
made substantive changes to the software.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS RELATED TO IRO INDEPENDENCE (on file with author); see also
Gosfield, supra note 279, § 7:12.
282. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. GUIDANCE ON IRO INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY 3-4,
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/docs/OIG_guidance_on_IRO_independence
_2010.pdf.
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objectivity.283 The following were services deemed not to impair IRO
independence:
 furnishing general compliance training to address CIA
requirements and employee responsibilities;
 performing routine tasks related to the company’s
confidential disclosure programs, such as answering a
confidential hotline;
 performing screening for ineligible persons by entering
employee names into an exclusion database;
 evaluating
and
presenting
conclusions
and
recommendations regarding the company’s compliance
program prior to the company’s CIA being executed;
 providing personnel to perform work plan procedures that
are developed by the company’s internal audit department,
so long as they are not related to subject matter of CIA
review;
 furnishing consulting services to the company under an
engagement that is completed prior to the start of the CIA
review and (1) that is unrelated to the subject matter of the
CIA review and (2) that does not involve performance of
management functions; and
 performing an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses
of the company’s internal controls, even if those controls
relate to the subject matter of the CIA review, so long as the
IRO is not responsible for designing or implementing
corrective action.284
By contrast, any of the following scenarios suggest a lack of
independence:
 the company utilizing a billing system or coding software
that was developed or designed by the IRO and the IRO
being engaged to perform a claims review thereof;
 IRO personnel furnishing specific training that addresses
the subject matter of the CIA review;
 the IRO developing the company’s policies, procedures, or
internal control systems;

283.
284.

See id.
Id.

354

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW







[Vol. XVII

the IRO participating in decision making functions related
to the confidential disclosure program, such as determining
which allegations warrant further investigation or corrective
action;
the IRO performing an assessment of the strengths and
weaknesses of the company’s internal controls associated
with specific risk areas addressed in the CIA and
implementing new processes or internal controls relating
thereto;
the company outsourcing its internal audit function to the
IRO; and/or
the IRO being engaged to provide consulting services to the
company during the term of the CIA on a matter related to
the subject matter thereof.285
ii. The Retention of Monitors

Some CIAs also require the retention of an independent monitor to
conduct the oversight mandated by DOJ and SEC resolutions.286
Typically, these monitors evaluate internal quality control systems and
corporate infrastructure.287 In addition, the monitor often has broad
access to the company’s facilities, data, records, and staff.288 Like their
counterparts in other enforcement proceedings, they must submit
periodic reports to the OIG and the company.289
The OIG generally selects the independent monitor, with some
input from the target company. The company pays the monitor’s fees
and related expenses.290 Monitors appointed pursuant to a CIA do,
however, “typically serve at the behest of the OIG and may be removed
solely at the discretion of the OIG.”291

285.
286.

Id.
These independent monitors are distinct from both IROs and from OIG lawyers
who serve as OIG’s internal monitors of the CIA. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at
5; see also Finegan, supra note 259, at 659.
287. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 5.
288. Id.
289. Finegan, supra note 259, at 659; FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 258, at 5.
290. FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 262, at 5.
291. Id.
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iii. Case Studies: Bayer and Eli Lilly
Over the past several decades, the OIG has entered into numerous
CIAs with health care providers, health insurers and managed care
companies, clinical laboratories, medical device manufacturers, and
research and generic pharmaceutical companies.292 Among the most
significant recent CIAs are those involving Bayer Health Care LLC
(“Bayer”)293 and Eli Lilly and Company (“Eli Lilly”).294 These CIAs
broke new ground in a number of respects, most notably creating clear
enterprise-wide accountability in the executive ranks and the
boardroom.295
The CIAs for both Bayer and Eli Lilly include sections regarding
“Management Accountability and Certifications.” Before the Bayer and
Eli Lilly CIAs, a compliance officer possessed the sole responsibility for
certifying that a company had: (1) complied with its obligations under
the CIA; (2) fulfilled training requirements; (3) reviewed and updated
compliance documents and policies; and (4) complied with federal
health care program requirements.296 The new “Management
Accountability and Certifications” require additional representations not
only from the compliance officer but also from extensive lists of
executive-level and management personnel.297 Both Bayer and Eli Lilly

292. See Corporate Integrity Agreement Documents, HHS.gov, http://oig.hhs
.gov/fraud/cia/cia_list.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2010).
293. Bayer entered into a CIA with OIG that became effective on November 25,
2008, as part of a broader civil settlement to resolve allegations that it paid kickbacks to
certain diabetic suppliers between 1998 and 2007, thereby causing the suppliers to
submit false Medicare claims. Corporate Integrity Agreement Between Office of
Inspector Gen. and Bayer LLC, supra note 254. See Scott A. Memmott, Recent Trends
Involving CIAs Significantly Raise Stakes for Health Care Industry Participants, 11 No.
2 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 51 (2009).
294. As part of a global settlement resulting from its introduction of misbranded
drugs, namely Zyprexa, into interstate commerce between 1999 and 2003; Eli Lilly
entered into a CIA with OIG that became effective on January 14, 2009. Corporate
Integrity Agreement Between Office of Inspector Gen. and Eli Lilly & Co., supra note
274. Eli Lilly entered into the CIA. Memmott, supra note 293, at 51.
295. Memmott, supra note 293, at 51.
296. Memmott, supra note 293, at 53-54.
297. See id.
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are, therefore, required to submit certifications from a broad array of
individuals at multiple levels of the organization.298
The Bayer and Eli Lilly CIAs also addressed corporate governance;
they imposed significant new requirements on the companies’ respective
boards of directors.299 Both companies’ boards are required to arrange
for performance reviews of the effectiveness of their compliance
programs for each reporting period.300 Bayer was also required to create
an additional panel of “three independent and objective individuals or
entities with expertise in compliance with federal health care program
and FDA requirements.”301 This panel must prepare and submit a written
report addressing their review of the compliance program and include
recommendations to the board regarding Bayer’s compliance
program.302
d. The United States Environmental Protection Agency
i. Regulatory Initiatives
In the late 1980s, the EPA began conducting enforcement and
compliance investigations of corporations, municipalities and other
organizations.303 Today, those inquiries are performed by the National
Enforcement Investigations Center (the “NEIC”), a unit of the EPA. If
an inquiry reveals an incident or pattern of non-compliance, the NEIC
works with the EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
(“OECA”) to develop a civil settlement agreement and to implement a
Compliance-Focused Environmental Management System (the
“CFEMS”).304 The CFEMS is comprised of twelve elements,305 intended
to bring the target of the EPA investigation back into compliance with

298. This included, among others, the companies’ chairmen; the chief executive
officers; executive directors and vice presidents; chief medical officers; and directors of
business units performing sales, pricing, marketing, contracting, promotions, medical
affairs or medical information functions. See id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. STEVEN SISK, COMPLIANCE-FOCUSED ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
- ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENT GUIDANCE 3 (5th ed. 2005).
304. Id. at 3.
305. Id. at 5-8.
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the applicable environmental protection laws, regulations and
administrative rules.
The twelve elements of a CFEMS are:
1. Environmental Policy—the actual adoption by the
organization of an environmental management system;
2. Organization, Personnel, and Oversight—the CFEMS must
identify and define the specific duties and responsibilities
of the key employees who will implement the new system;
3. Accountability
and
Responsibility—includes
both
incentives for managers and employees to comply with the
new CFEMS as well as the potential consequences for
noncompliance;
4. Environmental
Requirements—describes
applicable
environmental
requirements
and
interprets
their
applicability to the overall system;
5. Assessment, Prevention, Control—describes ongoing
process for identifying and assessing the organization’s
performance under the system as well as a system for
documenting routine self-inspections;
6. Environmental
Incident
and
Non-Compliance
Investigations—establishes procedures for both internal and
external reporting of incidents of non-compliance as well as
identification of problems to assist in correction of
noncompliance;
7. Environmental Training, Awareness and Competence—
describes the organization’s training to ensure personnel are
aware of applicable requirements and procedures to follow
to ensure compliance;
8. Environmental Planning and Organizational Decisionmaking—requires the organization to establish written
targets and objectives for improving environmental
performance on an annual basis;
9. Maintenance of Records and Documentation—identifies
records necessary for support of an Environmental
Management System (“EMS”), personnel responsible for
maintaining all records and security measures necessary to
prevent
unauthorized
disclosure
of
confidential
information;
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10. Pollution Prevention—describes the organization’s internal
process for preventing and/or minimizing waste and
emissions;
11. Continuing Program Evaluation and Improvement—
describes the schedule of periodic evaluation and auditing
of the EMS; and
12. Public Involvement/Community Outreach—requires a
program for ongoing community education regarding
general environmental awareness.306
Since 1997, the EPA has consistently encouraged the use of
independent third party auditors to conduct periodic examinations of the
EMS.307 Assuming a civil resolution is consummated, the auditor need
not be appointed until the organization has had sufficient time to
implement and refine the EMS.308 However, within one to three years,
depending on the size of the organization and the scope of the noncompliance issues, the EPA suggests that any settlement agreement
should require at least one independent audit, and the agency recognizes
that additional compliance audits may be warranted depending on the
particular circumstances of that organization. Results of these
assessments are to be reported to the organization and to the EPA.309
Guidance from the EPA suggests that the CFEMS should include
provisions regarding the selection criteria for the independent auditor.
She should not have been involved in the initial review of the CFEMS,
but she should be qualified to conduct an audit under EPA Operating
Procedure ISO 19011;310 have expertise and competence in regulatory
programs under both federal and state environmental laws; and have at
least a bachelor’s degree.311 In addition, the independent auditor may not
have any direct financial stake in the outcome of the EMS audit.312 The
company implementing the CFEMS should submit the identity of a
potential auditor to the EPA for approval within one year of the effective
date of the CFEMS. The EPA will notify the company whether the
306.
307.

Id.
Sisk, supra note 303, at 4; see also Guidance John P. Suarez, Assistant
Administrator, Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance to Regional
Administrators (I-X) & Regional Counsel (1-X) (June 12, 2003).
308. See Sisk, supra note 303, at 4.
309. See id.
310. See id. at Appendix A.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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proposed independent auditor candidate is acceptable, and if so, the
proposed candidate must be retained within ten days and conduct the
audit within 60 days of the EPA’s approval of her.313
The audit should be conducted in accordance with ISO 19011 and
the auditor shall assess the following:
1. whether there is a defined system or planned program for
the EMS;
2. to what extent the program has been implemented and is
being maintained;
3. the adequacy of the company’s internal self-assessment
programs under the CFEMS;
4. whether the company is effectively communicating
environmental requirements to its employees and those
working on its behalf;
5. whether further improvements are necessary;
6. whether there are observed deviations from the company’s
written requirements and procedures; and
7. whether continual improvement is occurring.314
ii. Case Study: Overseas Shipbuilding Group, Inc.
While the EPA oversees all civil enforcement of environmental
protection laws, and investigates alleged criminal violations of
environmental protection laws, criminal prosecutions for violations of
these laws are handled by the DOJ with assistance and input from the
EPA’s criminal enforcement program.315 Accordingly, the same
principles and DOJ memoranda that guide prosecutions of corporations
for general corporate wrongdoing, inform the prosecution of
corporations for criminal violations of environmental protection laws.316
As has been the recent trend in the DOJ’s handling of prosecution of

313.
314.
315.

Id. at Appendix A.
Id.
See Enforcement, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/index-e.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2012).
316. See Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental
Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by
the Violator (July 1, 1991), JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/enrd/3058.htm (last
visted Mar. 12, 2012).
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corporations, monitors are also being used with greater frequency in
criminal environmental cases.317
In December 2006, the DOJ issued a press release announcing that
it had entered into a plea agreement with Overseas Shipholding Group,
Inc. (“Overseas”) under which Overseas pleaded guilty to thirty-three
felony counts of violations to the Clean Water Act and Oil Pollution
Act.318 Pursuant to the resolution, Overseas was placed on organizational
probation for three years and agreed to pay $37 million in fines and
contributions to several environmental community service programs.319
The fine was one of the largest fiscal penalties imposed for
environmental violations in the history of the EPA. Overseas was also
required to implement an Environmental Compliance Plan (“ECP”) to
ensure that future violations would not occur.
The ECP required the company to appoint an operational
compliance officer.320 This officer could not be an employee of the
company, and though external to the company, was to be granted access
to “all records, documents, facilities, and vessels throughout OSG’s
operational organization . . . .”321 The operational compliance officer
was charged with supplying reports to Overseas’ Chief Executive
Officer regarding the company’s compliance with and implementation
of the Environmental Compliance Plan and other environmental
protection requirements.322
Overseas also was required to provide the DOJ with a list of
proposed candidates for an external audit group within thirty days of the
entry of the plea agreement.323 The group would perform an initial audit
of the company’s operation to review and identify any aspects of
Overseas’ operations that could potentially impact the environment.324
317. See SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/cases/criminal/summary.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012); see
also Guidance John P. Suarez, supra note 307, at 2.
318. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Overseas Shipholding Group Inc. Will
Pay Largest-Ever Penalty for Concealing Vessel Pollution (Dec. 19, 2006),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/December/06_opa_849.html.
319. Id.
320. Environmental Compliance Plan, United States v. Overseas Shipholding
Group, Inc., No 06 Civ. 65, 163 (E.D. Tex. May 17, 2006), at 4.
321. Id. at 4; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 318.
322. Environmental Compliance Plan, Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc., No 06
Civ. 65, 163, at 4-5.
323. Id. at 9.
324. Id.
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The external audit group was also charged with evaluating the
company’s implementation of an EMS and other environmental training
and compliance programs deemed necessary.325
Finally, within 18 months of the end of the three-year probationary
period, Overseas was required to identify yet another candidate or
candidates to serve as a third-party auditor for a final compliance
audit326 to determine whether Overseas had fully implemented its EMS
and established complete compliance with the ECP included in the plea
agreement.327 The findings of this final audit were submitted to the DOJ
and the company.328
The Overseas Environmental Compliance Program was one of the
most comprehensive plea agreements in an environmental case in the
history of the EPA’s Criminal Investigation group.329 Since the Overseas
case, the DOJ has increasingly required independent auditors or
corporate monitors to be a part of its plea agreements and ECPs.330 In
2009 and 2010, monitors or independent auditors were installed in the
majority of criminal cases for corporate environmental protection
violations.331
e. The United States Department of Labor
i. Regulatory Initiatives
The DOL is responsible for promoting the welfare of job
applicants, wage earners, and retirees through the improvement of
working conditions.332 In accordance with that mandate, the DOL
enforces a variety of federal laws, including those that guarantee
workers’ rights to safe and healthful working conditions, a minimum

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Press Release, supra note 318.
See Criminal Press Releases 2005/2006, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov
/compliance/resources/cases/criminal/highlights/2006/index.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2012).
331. See id.
332. Our Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdol/mission
.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
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hourly wage and overtime pay, freedom from employment
discrimination, unemployment insurance, and other income support.333
The Office of the Solicitor (the “SOL”) of the DOL represents the
agency in enforcement and defensive litigation, as well as alternative
dispute resolution activities.334 The SOL seeks to ensure equal treatment
in hiring and employment practices, payment of wages and benefits, safe
working conditions, standards of democracy and fiscal responsibility in
labor organizations, and safeguards for the income security of retired
workers.335 In its enforcement capacity, the SOL has often used third
party monitors to ensure that employers adhere to the terms of
settlement agreements with the DOL.336 What follows is a review of the
key labor and employment statutes that have provided the basis and
context for private sector oversight of corporate operations.
ii. The Occupational Safety and Health Act
OSHA “assure[s] so far as possible, every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.”337 The
DOL, through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a
constituent body of the DOL, is responsible for enforcing OSHA.338 The
DOL often pursues civil and administrative actions against corporations
accused of violating OSHA. The settlement of these actions generally
includes significant oversight of the corporation accused of the
underlying violation.339
333.
334.
335.

Id.
Id.
Office of the Solicitor, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/sol/media
/brochure/sol.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
336. See discussion infra, Part I.A.2.e (ii-iv).
337. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2006).
338. Id. § 670(d)(3).
339. Pursuant to its authority under OSHA, the DOL is authorized to make
reasonable workplace and worksite inspections to investigate “pertinent conditions,
structures, machines, [etc.], and to question privately any . . . employer, owner,
operator, agent or employee.” Id. § 657(a). Where there is a reasonable belief that an
employer has violated an OSHA standard, the DOL may issue a citation pursuant to
OSHA’s general duty clause, or any regulation issued under OSHA. See id. § 658(a). If
such efforts fail, the DOL is authorized to utilize litigation as a means of enforcing
OSHA. See id.; 29 CFR § 2200.33 (2009) et seq. OSHA specifically authorizes the
DOL to “appear for and represent the Secretary in any civil action brought under
[OSHA]” pursuant to the direction and control of the Attorney General. 29 U.S.C. §
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Third-party monitoring has been a key dimension to ensuring
corporate compliance with settlements resulting from OSHA violations.
For example, the DOL has required independent oversight throughout its
attempts to settle claims resulting from the 2005 explosion at BP
Products North America, Inc.’s (“BP”) Texas City, Texas refinery.340
The DOL and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
initially reached a Stipulation and Agreement with BP on September 22,
2005.341 The Stipulation and Agreement resulted in a $21 million fine, as
well as third-party oversight through the retention of an independent
firm to conduct a refinery-wide comprehensive audit and analysis of
BP’s process safety management; and the engagement of a third-party
expert to assess and report on the implementation of safety practices and
procedures.342 Safety violations nonetheless continued at the refinery,
and the DOL pursued additional claims against BP in October 2009.343
On August 12, 2010, the DOL announced a second Stipulation and
Agreement with BP. That agreement resulted in a record $50.6 million
fine against BP, in addition to BP’s commitment to allocate an
additional $500 million for remediation and abatement efforts at the
refinery.344 The second Stipulation and Agreement also included more
robust oversight mechanisms, including additional third-party
monitoring.345 As DOL Secretary Hilda L. Solis then emphasized:
“[T]his agreement provides an unprecedented level of oversight of BP’s
safety program including regular meetings with [the Occupational

663. OSHA, therefore, contemplates a role for the DOJ in any OSHA enforcement
action. The DOL does, however, possess significant discretion to settle such matters
including the creation of oversight programs. Id.
340. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, BP to pay $50.6 million to resolve US
Labor Department litigation (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owa
disp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=18156.
341. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, OSHA Fines BP Products North
America More Than $21 Million Following Texas City Explosion (Sept. 22, 2005)
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=11589&p_table=NE
WS_RELEASES.
342. See BP Products North America, Inc. Settlement Agreement, available at
http://www.osha.gov/as/oc/BPSettlementAgreementFinalDoc.pdf (last visited Oct. 5,
2010).
343. See OSHA Fact Sheet, BP History Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.osha.gov/dep/bp/bphistory.html, (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
344. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 340.
345. See id.
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Safety and Health Administration], frequent site inspections, and the
submission of quarterly reports . . . .”346
Independent third-party experts, or “Independent Verifiers,” play a
key role in the resolution scheme and are responsible for reviewing and
verifying that BP “is completing the required abatement actions . . .
[and] properly documenting completion.”347 Each Independent Verifier
is tasked with overseeing a separate aspect of the remediation and
abatement efforts contemplated in the agreement. An individual
Independent Verifier is not, however, prohibited from fulfilling more
than one oversight role.348
The Independent Verifiers are granted liberal access to BP’s
corporate records and facilities, as BP is required to “make available all
employees, including hourly and skilled (craft) employees, and
contractors, and all information (e.g., documents) requested to the
Independent Verifiers.”349 In turn, the Independent Verifiers are to
submit quarterly progress reports to the DOL, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, and specified parties at BP.350 The
Stipulation and Agreement does contemplate a role for BP officials in
the Independent Verifiers’ tasks, stating that while the Independent
Verifiers will “rely on their own skills, experience and professional
judgment,” they must “also give due deference to the reasonable
judgments of BP Products . . . .”351 The Stipulation and Agreement
includes the following salient provisions with respect to the role of the
Independent Verifier:
Prior to each Independent Verifier’s commencement of work under
this Agreement, BP Products and [the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration] shall collaborate regarding the scope of work
described below to be performed by the Independent Verifiers,
including review of the contracts and any amendments to be

346. Hilda L. Solis, Secretary, Occupational Safety & Health Administration,
Remarks During Telephone Conference Call OSHA Announces BP Agrees to Record
Penalty and Major Safety Improvements at Texas City, Texas Refinery,
http://www.osha.gov/dep/bp/Final_Solis_Remarks_BP.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
347. BP Products North America Inc., Stipulation and Agreement, § VIII(A),
available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=C
WSA&p_id=2002.
348. See id. § VIII(B)(1).
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. Id. § VIII(C).
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executed by the Independent Verifiers. Employees and their
authorized employee representatives shall be consulted in describing
and deciding on the scope of the work. BP Products, [the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration], and the
Independent Verifiers shall agree on the timing, nature and scope of
the work to be performed by the Independent Verifiers before the
Independent Verifiers begin work at the Refinery. In performing
their duties under this Agreement, including when rendering their
opinions . . . the Independent Verifiers will rely on their own skills,
experience and professional judgment, and will also give due
deference to the reasonable judgments of BP Products where
352
allowed . . . .

iii. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
The DOL also oversees and regulates labor organizations.353 In that
context, the DOL plays a key role in investigating and prosecuting labor
racketeering cases that implicate RICO.354 While RICO actions are
prosecuted almost exclusively by the DOJ, the DOL is heavily involved
in monitoring and investigating labor organizations, typically in the
wake of the DOJ proceedings.355
Congress expressly intended that RICO’s remedial provisions be
“liberally construed” to effectuate its “enhanced sanctions and new
remedies” laying the groundwork for its reputation as a “‘far-reaching
civil enforcement scheme.’”356 The DOJ has described an array of
“potentially intrusive remedies” available to prosecutors under RICO’s
civil provisions including “injunctive relief, reasonable restrictions on
defendants’ future activities, disgorgement of unlawful proceeds,
divestiture, dissolution, reorganization, removal from positions in an
entity, and appointment of court officers to administer and supervise the
affairs and operations of defendants’ entities and to assist courts in

352.
353.

Id.
See Office of Labor Management Standards, About OLMS, DOL.GOV,
http://www.dol.gov/olms/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
354. James B. Jacobs & Eileen M. Cunningham, The RICO Trusteeships After
Twenty Years: A Progress Report, 19 LAB. L. 419, 419-20 (2004) (discussing the
magnitude of the DOL’s involvement monitoring and investigating labor
organizations).
355. Id.
356. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL ATTORNEYS
(2007) [hereinafter CIVIL RICO].
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monitoring compliance with courts’ orders and in imposing sanctions
for violations of courts’ orders.”357
Private sector third-party trustees have played an important role in
the resolution of many civil RICO actions.358 Trustees are generally
appointed pursuant to the terms of a consent agreement between the
DOJ and the labor union. Among other matters, the trustees “administer
the affairs and operations of corrupted unions and related entities, and
assist the courts in monitoring compliance with the courts’ orders and in
imposing sanctions for violations of the courts’ orders.”359 In the lion’s
share of the cases, “formal selection of the trustee has been left up to the
presiding judge, with both the government and the union making
recommendations.”360 Appointed trustees have, for the most part, been
former federal prosecutors with experience in investigating and
prosecuting organized crime.361
iv. The Fair Labor Standards Act
The DOL also oversees and regulates wage standards, including
those dictating the minimum wage and overtime rules.362 The Fair Labor
Standards Act (the “FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. provides the
general parameters for these regulations.363 Pursuant thereto, the DOL
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to pursue
equitable relief or to recover damages related to wages, salary,
employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost by an
employee.364 The FLSA allows for injunctive relief to restrain such
violations and “other equitable relief as may be appropriate, including
employment, reinstatement, and promotion.”365

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

CIVIL RICO, supra note 356.
Jacobs & Cunningham, supra note 354, at 421-22.
CIVIL RICO, supra note 356.
Jacobs & Cunningham, supra note 354, at 424.
Id.
Victoria L. Bor et al., The Law of Workplace Environment: Understanding and
Complying with Employment, Environmental, Labor, Safety, and Whistleblower Laws,
SK043 ALI-ABA 53 (2004).
363. See id.
364. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2617(a)(1)(A), 2617(a)(1)(B), 2617(b)(2) (2006).
365. Id. § 2617(d).
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Independent monitors have also been imposed as part of settlement
agreements resolving FLSA-based actions.366 This has occurred in a
variety of contexts, but has been particularly prominent in the garment
industry.367 The DOL has long targeted such companies for violating
worker rights provided under the FLSA and other laws. Resulting
consent agreements between the DOL and such companies have often
included third-party oversight.368 Accordingly, many apparel companies
have “agreed to use independent monitors from ‘for-profit’ auditing
firms or [to] send inspectors into contract factories to audit the payroll
records of their contractors.”369
B. TRANSNATIONAL SETTINGS
1. Corporate Oversight Abroad
Prosecutions of, and enforcement proceedings against, business
organizations historically has been viewed as a peculiarly American
phenomenon, with most overseas inquiries focusing on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act.370 Over the past decade, however, the DOJ and
the SEC have increasingly collaborated with their counterparts in
Canada, Western Europe and elsewhere.
On November 15, 2006, Munich law enforcement officials
searched the corporate offices of Siemens AG and certain of its highlevel employees as part of an investigation into the bribery of foreign
officials.371 Shortly after the raid in Munich, Siemens self-reported
possible FCPA violations to the SEC and the DOJ.372 During the ensuing
two years, the DOJ and the Commission worked together with the
366. See Heidi S. Bloomfield, “Sweating” the International Garment Industry: A
Critique of the Presidential Task Force’s Workplace Codes of Conduct and Monitoring
System, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 567 (1999).
367. Id. at 568.
368. Id. at 584.
369. Id.
370. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Willbros Grp.,
Inc., No. H-08-287 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008).
371. Gerhard Cromme, Chairman of the Audit Comm., Siemans AG, Statement at
Annual Shareholders’ Meeting of Siemens AG (Jan. 25, 2007), available at
http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/en/events/hauptversammlung/sie_hv_speech_crom
me_1430865.pdf.
372. Id.
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German authorities to investigate thoroughly the company’s activities.373
In December 2008, Siemens resolved the DOJ’s and the SEC’s concerns
through an agreement that imposed a corporate monitor and required the
payment of $800 million in fines; $450 million of which the DOJ
collected and the Commission received the remainder.374 The company
also resolved matters with the public prosecutor in Munich, agreeing to
pay EUR 395 million (approximately $569 million).375 Commenting on
the investigation and resolution, then Director of the Enforcement
Division of the SEC, Linda Thomsen, characterized the case as
groundbreaking with respect to the coordinated law enforcement effort
between the United States authorities and foreign prosecutors.376
The DOJ and the Commission now routinely pursue their corporate
targets with the active assistance of foreign national and local
authorities.377For example, the investigation of Hollinger International,
Inc. was conducted and overseen by the SEC with “the assistance and
cooperation” of the Ontario Securities Commission.378 In that case, the
Commission selected Mr. Breeden as the Special Monitor.
Similarly, in December 2010, the DOJ and SEC announced the
resolution of a joint FCPA investigation that included the entry of a
DPA and a payment of more than $137 million in fines to American
authorities, and the appointment of a corporate monitor.379 The case
flowed from an investigation that Costa Rican authorities initiated into

373.
374.

Id.
Id.; Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines,
(Dec. 15, 2008), JUSTICE.GOV, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm1105.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Seimens AG and Three Subsidiaries
Plead Guilty].
375. Id; Seimens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty, supra note 374.
376. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference
Announcing Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Violations (Dec. 15, 2008).
377. See id.
378. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Fraud Charges Against Conrad Black, F.
David Radler & Hollinger Inc. (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2004-155.htm.
379. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three
Subsidiaries Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Investigation (Dec. 27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010
/December/10-crm-1481.html [hereinafter DOJ Alcatel-Lucent FCPA Investigation
Resolution Press Release].
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bribes that consultants of an Alcatel-Lucent affiliate allegedly had paid
to public officials, political parties and representatives of the Costa
Rican state-owned telephone company to gain procurement contracts
there.380 In a history-making settlement for the Costa Rican government,
Alcatel-Lucent became the first foreign company to pay damages to
resolve corruption charges.381 French authorities also are investigating
the company.382
The DOJ/SEC inquiry and the resulting DPA resolved charges of
corrupt payments not only to Costa Rican officials, but also to
authorities in Honduras, Taiwan and Malaysia, to secure business
opportunities in those countries.383 Alcatel-Lucent also admitted to
FCPA violations in connection with third-parties it retained in Kenya,
Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Ivory Coast, Angola, Uganda
and Mali, that netted the company over $48 million in profits.384 The
DPA requires the imposition of a corporate monitor for a three-year
term.385 The monitor, who will oversee the company’s continued
380. See id.; see also Alcatel-Lucent, Condensed Consolidated Financial
Statements, June 30, 2010, at 43.
381. See DOJ Alcatel-Lucent FCPA Investigation Resolution Press Release, supra
note 379.
382. Alcatel-Lucent, Corporate Responsibility Website – A Responsible Behaviour –
Controversies, ALCATEL-LUCENT.COM, (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.alcatellucent.com/csr/htm/en/pdf/(Controversies_Investigations_In_France_eng.pdf.
383. See DOJ Alcatel-Lucent FCPA Investigation Resolution Press Release, supra
note 379; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No.
10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Alcatel Deferred Prosecution
Agreement].
384. See DOJ Alcatel-Lucent FCPA Investigation Resolution Press Release, supra
note 379; Alcatel Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 379.
385. Alcatel Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 379, ¶¶ 3, 13. Under the
DPA, Alcatel-Lucent is empowered to propose to the DOJ three monitor candidates,
and to express its preference. The Department reserves the right to select the monitor
from the candidates proposed by Alcatel-Lucent; the DOJ could also reject all of the
nominees and require the company to propose additional candidates. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. The
monitor candidates must have expertise on the FCPA and French anti-corruption laws,
experience developing and implementing compliance policies, procedures, and internal
control mechanisms, especially such as would be designed to address FCPA and anticorruption issues; “the ability to access and deploy resources as necessary to discharge”
her duties; and independence from Alcatel-Lucent. Id. ¶ 10. The DPA further requires
the monitor to conduct three annual reviews of the company and issue a report, and
each review shall be preceded by a written work plan which is submitted for review and
comment to the company and the French authority selected by the DOJ. Id. attach. D ¶
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implementation of a FCPA compliance program and review and make
recommendations to bolster the company’s internal controls, policies
and procedures, must make annual reports to the Government.386
Coordinated complex transnational enforcement proceedings are
now commonplace, and have resulted in the appointment of independent
private sector monitors with substantial cross-border reporting lines.387
For example, the monitor appointed in the Siemens case was, for the
first time, a non-U.S. monitor—a former German finance minister.388
While the monitor appointed in the Statoil case was an American, the
deferred prosecution agreement required that the monitor’s activities
“not be contrary to Norwegian law” and that all confidential company
business information be maintained “in conformity with Norwegian
law.”389 In addition, where regulatory jurisdictions overlap, the

3. The DOJ has the decision authority to resolve any dispute with respect to the work
plan. Id. The initial report is due within 120 days of the monitor’s initial review, which
must start within 120 days of the monitor’s engagement. The monitor’s reports are to be
issued simultaneously to both the company and the designated French authority, who
would then transmit the report to the DOJ. Id. attach. D ¶ 4. Upon receipt of the
monitor’s report, Alcatel-Lucent is to adopt the recommendations within 120 days or,
within 60 days, object in writing to the monitor concerning any recommendation it
finds impracticable and propose an alternative course of action. In that event, the
monitor and company must then negotiate the resolution of the disputed
recommendation; if unable to do so, the DOJ is the final decision maker as to what
recommendation to implement. Id. attach. D ¶ 5. In the event the monitor discovers
misconduct, she may report the matter directly to Alcatel-Lucent’s General Counsel or
the Audit Committee of the company’s Board of Directors. Id. attach. D ¶ 8. Depending
on the circumstances, including implications for French law, the monitor is empowered
to report misconduct directly to the DOJ, if not the designated French authority, who
may then inform the Department. Id.
386. Id. attach. D ¶¶ 1, 4.
387. See, e.g., id. attach. D ¶¶ 2(b) (requiring the company, at the request of the
monitor, to notify the monitor and any French authority appointed by the U.S.
Department of Justice, who then may report to the U.S. Department of Justice in
accordance to French law); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Technip
S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010) [hereinafter Technip Deferred
Prosecution Agreement] (urging consultation with France’s Central Service for the
Prevention of Corruption, an adjunct of the French Ministry of Justice, and consultation
with French authorities, as appropriate).
388. BRUCE YANNETT, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: AN OVERVIEW, 1814
PLI/CORP 721, 755 (May 19, 2010).
389. Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA
Enforcement, Shearman & Sterling, October 1, 2009; see also Technip Deferred
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possibility of conflicting or competing regulations is much greater than
in an investigation run by just one agency.390 This increases the
likelihood of conflicting demands on a corporate monitor as well.
2. The United Kingdom
a. Regulatory Initiatives
In the United Kingdom, the two agencies with primary
responsibility for prevention and prosecution of corporate fraud and
corruption are the Serious Fraud Office (the “SFO”) and the Financial
Services Authority (the “FSA”).391 The SFO prosecutes cases of
corporate corruption occurring within the United Kingdom or overseas.
Until 2008, the SFO was often criticized for its “lackluster” prosecution
record.392 In the past two years, however, the agency has adopted new
guidelines for the prosecution of transnational bribery and corruption
offenses and has achieved success with Civil Recovery Orders (“CRO”),
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 387 (requiring certain aspects of the DPA and
monitor’s duties to comply with French law).
390. LINDA CHATMAN THOMSEN, DOMINICK D. BARBIERI & MATHEW S. MILLER,
DEALING WITH MULTIPLE REGULATORS: REFLECTIONS ON PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS,
REGULATORS’ DIFFERING ROLES, AND ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN REPRESENTING
ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTS, Practicing Law Institute Order No. 19278 (2009). The
Alcatel-Lucent DPA provides a further example where the monitor was required to be a
French national whose expertise included the anti-corruption provisions of French law
who had reporting obligations to the DOJ that were to be facilitated by a “French
Authority identified by the Department.” Alcatel Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
supra note 383, ¶ 10, attach. D ¶ 2(b).
391. See Sarah Cleary & Lucy Candey, Who’s Watching You? Rise of Corporate
Monitoring (2010), available at http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/fraud-andcorporate-crime/7981-whos-watching-you-rise-of-corporate-monitoring;
see
also
SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, APPROACH OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE TO DEALING WITH
OVERSEAS CORRUPTION (2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/128701/
approach%20of%20the%20serious%20fraud%20office%20v6.pdf [hereinafter SFO
Approach].
392. RICHARD CRAIG SMITH ET AL., Recent International Anti-Corruption
Enforcement Efforts & Compliance Guidance, FULBRIGHT BRIEFING (2009), available
at http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail&pub_id=4271
&site_id=494 (last visited June 17, 2010); see also Lecture, ICID, Talking Corruption
With the SFO: Presentation by Richard Alderman, Director Serious Fraud Office (Oct.
20, 2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/director’s-speeches
/speeches-2009/talking-corruption-with-the-sfo.aspx.
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resolutions which include various conditions.393 They are modeled after
the DOJ guidelines for prosecution of a corporation laid out in the Filip
Memorandum.394
Adopted in 2009, the guidelines, titled “Approach of the Serious
Fraud Office to Dealing with Overseas Corruption” (the “SFO
Approach”) and “Attorney General’s Guidelines on Plea Discussions in
Cases of Serious or Complex Fraud” (the “SFO Guidelines”), read very
similarly to the Filip Memorandum and its predecessors.395 Of primary
importance in the SFO guidelines are corporate self-regulation, selfreporting if wrongdoing is uncovered, and continued monitoring.
Voluntary disclosure is perhaps the most important consideration in the
SFO’s decision whether to resolve an inquiry through a civil agreement
or a criminal plea.396 The SFO may not appoint a monitor on its own.
Any such appointment must be part of a civil agreement between the
parties or through the criminal courts.397 Under the guidelines, a monitor
must be “an independent, well-qualified individual nominated by the
corporate and accepted by [the SFO].”398 The scope of a monitorship is
set forth in the agreement between the corporation and the SFO; it must
be “proportionate to the issues involved.”399
b. Case Studies
i. Balfour Beatty, PLC
In SFO v. Balfour Beatty PLC, the SFO reached a civil resolution
after the company self-reported payment “irregularities” and false
accounting relating to the construction of the Alexandria Library in

393. See generally SFO Approach, supra note 391; Attorney General, Attorney
General’s Guidelines on Plea Discussions in cases of Serious or Complex Fraud,
ATTORNEYGENERAL.GOV.UK, (Mar. 18, 2009), available at http://www.attorney
general.gov.uk/Publications/Documents/AG’s%20Guidelines%20on%20Plea%20Discu
ssions%20in%20Cases%20of%20Serious%20or%20Complex%20Fraud.pdf.
[hereinafter, SFO Guidelines]
394. Cleary & Candey, supra note 391.
395. See generally SFO Approach, supra note 391; SFO Guidelines, supra note 393.
396. SFO Approach, supra note 391, ¶¶ 22, 24.
397. See SFO Approach ¶ 14.
398. See SFO Approach, supra note 391, ¶ 14.
399. See SFO Approach, supra note 391, ¶ 14.

2012]

ANSWERING TO A HIGHER AUTHORITY

373

Egypt in 2001.400 Though Balfour Beatty denied that these payment
“irregularities” were bribes, it did accept as part of the settlement
agreement that the payments and false accounting were unlawful.401
Balfour Beatty paid a £2.25 million civil settlement payment and agreed
to contribute to the legal costs of the SFO proceeding.402 It also agreed
to submit to a period of external monitoring.403
ii. Mabey & Johnson, Ltd.
R. v. Mabey & Johnson Ltd. marked the SFO’s first criminal
conviction of an overseas corruption since the Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act of 2001.404 After pleading guilty to making corrupt
payments in Ghana and Jamaica and to breaching the United Nations
sanctions against trade with Iraq, the SFO and the company entered into
a criminal plea agreement.405 Part of the agreement, approved by the
criminal court, required the appointment of a corporate monitor whose
fee was £250,000 for a three-year monitorship.406
iii. Innospec, Inc.
In a suite of cases involving Innospec, Inc. and certain of its
subsidiaries ("Innospec"), a cooperative, world-wide investigation by
enforcement authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom
culminated with Innospec pleading guilty in the United States to
400. See Cleary & Candey, supra note 391; David Leigh & Rob Evans, Balfour
Beatty Agrees to Pay £2.25m over Allegations of Bribery in Egypt, THE GUARDIAN,
Oct. 7, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/oct/07/balfour
beatty.egypt.
401. See Leigh and Evans, supra note 400.
402. Id.
403. Id.; see also Cleary & Candey, supra note 391.
404. Id.; see also Gary DiBianco et al., Serious Fraud Office Begins to Achieve
Concrete Results From Focus on Overseas Corruption, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom LLP & Affiliates Client Alert, Oct. 8, 2009; Press Release, Serious Fraud
Office, Mabey & Johnson Ltd. Sentencing (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.sfo.gov/
uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2009/mabey—johnson-ltdsentencing.aspx.
405. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Mabey & Johnson Ltd Sentencing (Sept.
25, 2009), http://www.sfo.gov/uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2009
/mabey—johnson-ltd-sentencing.aspx.
406. Cleary & Candey, supra note 391.
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conspiracy to corrupt, violations of the FCPA and of the U.S. embargo
against Cuba, and to defrauding the United Nations.407 As part of its
agreement to resolve charges brought by the DOJ, Innospec agreed to
hire an independent monitor to review and evaluate its internal controls,
record keeping and compliance practices.408 In the United Kingdom,
Innospec's British subsidiary, Innospec, Ltd., agreed to pay a criminal
penalty and pleaded guilty to making corrupt payments to a foreign
government official to resolve charges brought by the SFO.409 As a
result of the combined efforts of the SFO, the DOJ, the SEC and other
agencies, the global settlement required Innospec to disgorge illicit
profits, settle charges, and pay fines and penalties totaling $40.2
million.410
3. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
In 2008, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (the “OECD”)411 released “Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises” as a Supplement to the Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the
“Anti-Bribery Convention” or the “Convention”).412 The Convention,
407. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Innospec Inc. Pleads Guilty to FCPA
Charges and Defrauding the United Nations; Admits to Violating the U.S. Embargo
Against Cuba (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm278.html.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. The OECD is a forum of 30 countries which have joined to address the
“economic, social and environmental challenges of globalization.” Its member countries
are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
412. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011)
[hereinafter Anti-Bribery Convention]; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2008),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2011) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
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initially adopted on November 21, 1997, and updated on November 26,
2009, seeks to combat bribery in international business transactions
through a cooperative process of reporting, monitoring and mutual legal
assistance between member countries.413 While the Anti-Bribery
Convention does not expressly provide for the imposition of an
independent corporate monitor, it does call for “company and business
accounting, external audit, as well as internal controls, ethics, and
compliance requirements and practices.”414 The Convention also
requires each signatory to monitor and report its progress and level of
success implementing the goals of the Convention.415 The costs of this
oversight are to be assessed and handled through the normal OECD
budget process, with cost-sharing measures to be adopted for monitoring
of non-members of the OECD.416
Whether the updated Anti-Bribery Convention and the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises will be successful in
identifying and combating bribery and corrupt practices in international
business transactions remains to be seen. The Obama Administration is
undertaking to collaborate with the OECD.417 On May 31, 2010,
Attorney General Eric Holder delivered remarks to the OECD regarding
the United States’ continuing efforts to prosecute financial fraud, bribery
offense and other corrupt practices around the world.418 At the
conclusion of his remarks, he invited prosecutors from all OECD
member and signatory countries to gather at the June 14, 2010 meeting

413.
414.

See Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 412.
See OECD Working Group in Bribery in International Business Transactions,
Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, (Nov. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/oecd-recommendation.pdf (last visited
Feb. 25, 2011); Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 412.
415. See Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 412, art. 12.
416. Id.
417. Mark Brzezinski, Obama Administration Gets Tough on Business Corruption
Overseas, WASH. POST, May 28, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052704154.html.
418. Eric Holder, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (May 31, 2010), available
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100531.html (last visited Feb.
25, 2011) [hereinafter Holder OECD Speech].
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of the Working Group to discuss appropriate next steps in furtherance of
this goal.419
II. INDEPENDENT PRIVATE SECTOR OVERSIGHT:
CONSIDERATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS
The imposition of independent private sector oversight raises a
number of profound policy questions, along with practical
considerations, regarding the charter for, and selection and deployment
of, a monitor, a consultant or a review organization. Scholars and
practitioners have thoughtfully explored some of these issues.420 We
discuss below those which we have concluded to be fundamental to the
construct.
A. DEFINING THE ROLE
In the resolution documents or the governing judicial order,
enforcement officials, regulators and the company under investigation
should make every effort to delineate carefully, and with particularity,
the duties and responsibilities of the monitor, consultant or review
organization. A certain degree of flexibility is warranted because of the
substantial temporal duration of the ongoing oversight. At a minimum,
however, the parties should make clear that the role is to monitor and
not investigate the company’s affairs.421
419.
420.

Id.
See, e.g., Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3 at 1724-25; David M. Lagaie,
DPAs, NPAs Face Scrutiny As Their Numbers Increase, The Legal Intelligencer, Feb.
27, 2008, at 1; James M. Keneally, Draconian Consequences of the DPA, 240 N.Y.L.J.
9, (2008); Matt Senko, Note, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 178 (2009).
421. Without precise language that clearly and precisely defines the scope of the
monitorship and the monitor’s obligations with regard to the company, disputes
between the company and monitor may arise and one or both parties may attempt to
steer the scope of the monitorship in its desired direction. A common, but preventable,
result when the monitor seeks to expand her role beyond the mandate expressed in the
resolution documents is “scope creep.” See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 172425; Lagaie, supra note 420. Absent clear guidance in the operative documents, a
monitor’s duties may change over the course of the monitorship, making the endeavor
much more costly for the company than originally intended or anticipated by the
prosecuting document. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1724-25. Aside from
scope creep, the absence of clear guidance leads to a lack of uniformity from one
monitorship to the next—while some monitors are granted very limited powers to
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Typically, the focus of oversight correlates to the enforcement or
regulatory concerns that gave rise to, or were discovered during, an
internal or public sector investigation. When resolving the matter, the
parties should discuss and reach a well-documented consensus regarding
the role of the monitor or consultant in the day-to-day operations of the
company. Unless there is a legitimate concern that existing members of
management are conducting themselves unethically or unlawfully, or
that corporate data, information or records are being destroyed, the
oversight should consist of observation, inquiry and reporting. It should
not, expressly or implicitly, include the authority to approve hiring or
compensation decisions, commercial transactions, financial matters or
strategic plans or initiatives.422 Of course, was a company to consider
seriously a merger, acquisition or divestiture during a monitor’s tenure,
she should be so advised before the operative agreement has been
negotiated and executed.
In the same vein, the parties should create specific mechanisms for
addressing compliance, legal, financial and operational concerns that
might be identified by the company or by the monitor or consultant in
the course of her work.423 They should include rational reporting

ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of the resolution, others are given very
broad power, and may, in some circumstances, assume a de facto managerial role in the
company. Lagaie, supra note 420. The government and company may avoid these
pitfalls through more definite language delineating the scope of a monitor’s role and
authority at a company in the prosecuting documents.
422. Another byproduct of the monitor’s imprecise scope is possible usurpation of
corporate responsibilities. As one commentator has noted, “the chief problem with the
implementation of an independent monitor is the unchecked authority the monitor has
to alter corporate infrastructure and accumulate expenses without accountability.”
Senko, supra note 420, at 178. While the company may disagree with the monitor’s
recommendations or actions, where the government controls the monitor selection and
appointment process the company may “have very little practical recourse for
contesting perceived abuses or forcibly adopted policies.” Id. Moreover, the
government may weigh the company’s decision to adopt the monitor’s
recommendations when assessing compliance with the prosecution agreement. Id. Thus,
the company may feel compelled to comply with impracticable recommendations only
to appear cooperative and satisfy its bargain. Id.
423. In drafting and negotiating NPAs, DPAs and analogous resolution agreements,
corporations should analyze carefully proposed “non-contradiction” provisions
mandating that the corporation not make any public statement contradicting any factual
allegation or criminal charge filed by the enforcement agency. Keneally, supra note
420; see, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.,
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obligations that flow from the nature of the concern or allegation,
evaluated in light of the underlying transgressions. Alternate reporting
channels should include the Board of Directors, the General Counsel
and the Chief Compliance Officer, and under certain circumstances,
appropriate enforcement officials or regulators. If a need to investigate a
matter arises, the resolution documents should set forth criteria and a
procedure for law enforcement officials to evaluate the allegations or
report and determine whether they, the Board or the company will
handle the inquiry.424
A critical and still unresolved question in this enforcement
resolution model is how most effectively to supervise the work and
resolve fairly disputes that may arise between the company and the
consultant or monitor.425 Commentators have explored the notions of
judicial and independent private sector oversight; the former “would
eliminate monetary and other incentives monitors have to extend their
own stay or recommend indictment.” 426 The DOJ has offered guidance
through the Grindler Memorandum that the resolution agreements
“should explain what role the Department could play in resolving
disputes”427 between the company and its monitor, leaving it to the
parties, in the context of their specific circumstance, to collaborate
towards a satisfactory outcome for all concerned.

No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United
States v. Technip S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010); Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Willbros Grp., Inc., No. H-08-287 (S.D. Tex.
May 14, 2008); Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. WellCare Health
Plans, Inc., No. 8:09-cr-00203 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2009). A company’s ability to defend
itself in private sector lawsuits can be impaired by any such requirement that does not
acknowledge the organization’s rights in this regard. Keneally, supra note 420.
424. Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1724-25.
425. As one commentator has noted, “the lack of judicial oversight of the monitor’s
jurisdiction and authority may result in excessive and unfair burdening of corporate
entities. For example, “some suggest that Bristol-Myers may have fired their CEO and
general counsel to induce their monitor not to seek removal of the DPA.” Senko, supra
note 420, at 178. In this respect, judicial monitoring could also allow the corporation to
avoid less stringent enforcement of certain monitor recommendations. Id.
426. See id.
427. Grindler Memorandum, supra note 131.
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B. SELECTION
The lynchpin of the private sector oversight model is qualified
independence. It is axiomatic that the monitor or consultant must be a
neutral third party,428 and the integrity of the selection process has been
perhaps the most highly publicized dimension of the scheme. In 2008, in
response to a Congressional inquiry, the DOJ identified corporate
monitor appointments over an eight-year period.429 Not surprisingly, the
majority of persons selected to serve as monitors were former federal
government officials, including at least twenty-three former
prosecutors.430 One appointment became particularly controversial. In
late 2007, the then United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey
appointed the Attorney General under whom he had served, as the
monitor for medical equipment manufacturer Zimmer Holdings.431 The
selection occurred apparently without consideration of other qualified
individuals or firms, and over a period of eighteen months; the attendant
fees and expenses reportedly reached $52 million.432
Congress thereafter initiated an inquiry into the Department’s use
of deferred prosecutions and the selection of corporate monitors.433
Remedial legislation, the “Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act,”
was introduced in the United States House of Representatives in both
the 2008 and 2009 Congressional legislative sessions, but to date, no bill

428. Bart M. Schwartz, Becoming a Monitor and Getting the Job Done, SM05
A.L.I. 425 (2006). As one author has observed, “red flags” include: “(a) any work that
[has been] done for the parties previously, (b) requests from the monitored party . . . to
do work that is not part of the agreement and (c) the use of the assignment to curry
favor with one side or the other for future assignments.” Id.
429. Eric Lichtblau & Kitty Bennett, 30 Ex-Government Officials Got Lucrative
Posts as Corporate Monitors, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A23.
430. Id.
431. Lisa Brennan, Pols Seek Controls on Monitor Picks in Light of Reported $52M
Fee to Ashcroft, 190 N.J.L.J 895 (2007).
432. Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2008, at A1; Eric Lichtblau & Kitty Bennett, supra note 429, at A23.
433. See id.; Christopher J. Gunther & Robert M. Pollak, Scrutiny of Monitors is on
the Rise: Pending Legislation and Recently Issued DOJ Guidelines Reflect a Concern
Over Possible Conflicts, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 24, 2008, at 1; Lisa Brennan, Bill Would
Place Judicial Constraints on Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 191 N.J.L.J. 259,
Nov. 28, 2008.
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has been enacted. The DOJ responded by issuing the Morford and
Grindler Memoranda in March 2008 and May 2010, respectively.434
One critical issue not addressed in the DOJ memoranda is the
expertise and experience of the monitor. Enforcement officials,
regulators, companies and monitor or consultant candidates must all
recognize that to be effective, the oversight will require substantial
expertise and that for years after the monitor has concluded her work, it
might be scrutinized by legislators, the media and/or private sector
litigants through their counsel. Monitors and independent consultants
have been engaged by a broad array of companies including medical
equipment manufacturers, health insurers, financial services firms,
shipbuilders, and petroleum producers. Many former prosecutors who
have been appointed as monitors have had little or no experience
working in a corporation, much less the industry in question. It is in the
interests of both the enforcement agency and the company, albeit for
different reasons, to select a duly qualified monitor with the requisite
personal expertise and experience or an assembled team that has the
necessary capabilities.
Ideally, by the time a resolution has been negotiated and executed,
the administrative enforcement agency will be comfortable including the
company, to some extent, in the selection process, an approach that
leverages the disproportionate resources available to the respective
parties.435 Through its General Counsel and/or its Chief Compliance
Officer, a corporation or firm can develop, for the agency’s
consideration, proposed criteria and procedures for selecting the
monitor. Consistent with the principles enunciated in the Morford and
Grindler Memoranda, a company can designate representatives to elicit
proposals from, and interview, candidates for the monitorship. A
comprehensive synopsis of the process, together with a thoughtful
assessment of the candidates and a “short list” of recommendations can
assist the agency immeasurably as it identifies candidates to be
interviewed and ultimately selected.436
434.

See Morford Memorandum, supra note 92; Grindler Memorandum, supra note

131.
435. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶¶ 10-11, United States v. AlcatelLucent, S.A., No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010); Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, United States v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. H-08-287 (S.D. Tex. May 14,
2008).
436. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶¶ 10-11, United States v. AlcatelLucent, S.A., No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010); Deferred Prosecution
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C. RETENTION
After a monitor or consultant has been selected, she and the
company typically execute a retention agreement. If the monitor is a
practicing lawyer, under applicable ethical rules, her receipt of fees from
the company could be deemed to create an attorney-client
relationship.437 This is, of course, at odds with the notion of third-party
independence and neutrality.438 One possible solution is the creation of a
trust with an independent trustee to administer the payments to the
monitor.
D. DEPLOYMENT
Once a resolution has been negotiated and a monitor selected, she
must begin the process of educating herself about the sector and the

Agreement, United States v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. H-08-287 (S.D. Tex. May 14,
2008).
437. See, e.g., State Bar of Arizona’s Committee on the Rules of Professional
Conduct, Ethics Opinion 02-04 (Sept. 2002) (payment of a fee to an attorney is one
factor to consider in determining whether an attorney-client relationship exists (citing In
re Pappas, 159 Ariz. 516, 522 (1988))); 48 AMJUR 2D Proof of Facts § 52 (proof of
payment of fees to an attorney may be “conclusive” evidence of an attorney-client
relationship). But see Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messera, 958 F.
Supp. 869, 891 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1997) (finding that trustee’s lawyer did not also
assume representation of fund absent “explicit undertaking,” even though pension fund
paid trustee’s lawyer’s fees). In the Alcatel-Lucent DPA, the parties addressed this
ethical conundrum through specific agreement that “the retention of the Monitor does
not establish an attorney-client, auditor-client, or similar relationship between AlcatelLucent and the Monitor that would otherwise prevent the Monitor from fulfilling its
Mandate in accordance with this Agreement.” Deferred Prosecution Agreement,
Attachment D ¶ 2(a), United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 20, 2010).
438. Schwartz, supra note 428; see also Morford Memorandum, supra note 92,
Principle II. The Morford Memorandum, for instance, states that a monitor is “by
definition” independent of the company and the government. Id. at 4-5. Focusing
primarily on confidentiality and evidentiary privileges and doctrines, enforcement and
regulatory officials have taken the position that there is no attorney-client relationship
between a lawyer and the subject corporation. This can leave the monitor and her law
firm in an untenable position.
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company. As expeditiously as is possible, she should develop a
comprehensive work plan.439
For even the largest and most sophisticated companies, a
monitorship is a significant burden on personnel. Few firms have inhouse professionals who have worked with a monitor or an independent
consultant. At the outset of the engagement, the company should
designate a liaison, such as the General Counsel or the Chief
Compliance Officer, to work directly with the monitor. A system for
receiving and responding to requests for corporate records, site visits
and interviews must be developed,440 and adequate and capable
personnel must be assigned to the team to support the liaison. A protocol
for conducting interviews of current and former employees should be
crafted before any such work is undertaken; it should address, for
example, what background information will be provided to individuals
and who will be permitted to attend the meetings.441
Corporate monitorships enable agencies to outsource a critical
function at an attractive price; the company, rather than the government
or the taxpayers, foots the bill.442 The fees paid to a corporate monitor,
moreover, are not generally made public,443 and Congress and various
439. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 3, at 1724-25; James K. Robinson, et al.,
Deferred Prosecutions and the Independent Monitor, 2 INT’L. J. DISCLOSURE &
GUIDANCE 325, 326-27 (2005). See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement Attachment
D ¶ 3, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010);
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Willbros Grp., Inc., No. H-08-287,
(S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008).
440. Materials should be processed through the legal or compliance department and
they should be well-organized according to custodian and numbered, with an archive
set maintained internally.
441. Counsel representing an individual in the underlying enforcement investigation
should be notified promptly of a request for an interview by a monitor, and upon
request, be permitted to attend. By contrast, in most cases, monitors and consultants can
be expected to request that in-house or outside counsel to the company not participate
in such sessions.
442. See Sue Reisinger, Someone to Watch Over You, CORP. COUNS., Sept. 20,
2007.
443. Because many corporations that have been subject to a monitorship are
publicly traded, some argue that the corporation’s shareholders have a right to know
how much money is being paid to the monitor. In the case of AIG, members of
Congress have recently argued that the taxpayers, by virtue of the government’s equity
stake in the company, have a right to review the fees paid to and reports prepared by
James Cole to understand whether the fees paid to the monitor were properly spent.
Thomas Brom, Monitoring the Monitors, Daily Journal Corp. (quoting letter from
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stakeholders have repeatedly called for greater accountability and
transparency in the selection of and fees paid to corporate monitors.444
Monitors usually are required to report periodically to enforcement
officials on the company’s compliance with the terms of the agreement
and the underlying applicable statutes and regulations. The frequency of
such submissions is typically quarterly or semi-annually.445 Over the
years, a number of approaches have been adopted with respect to
informing the Board of Directors and the senior management team of
the monitor’s findings and observations. It is now common practice to
require the monitor to submit her report simultaneously to the regulators
and to the company.446 The corporation is thereafter afforded an
opportunity to respond to the submission. If a material disagreement
crystallizes, the agency resolves it definitively with no right of appeal.447

Congress to SEC requesting disclosure of reports prepared by AIG monitor, James
Cole); Sue Reisinger, AIG’s Fall Raises Questions About Corporate Monitoring, CORP.
COUNS., June 23, 2009 [hereinafter Reisinger, AIG’s Fall]; Sue Reisinger, It’s Broken,
CORP. COUNS., July 1, 2009 [hereinafter Reisinger, It’s Broken].
444. Accountability, Transparency, and Uniformity in Corporate Deferrred and
Non-Prosecution Agreements Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Commercial and Administrative Law, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Rep. Bill
Pascrell, Jr.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Pascrell090625.pdf;
Lisa Brennan, supra note 431, at 873; Reisinger, AIG’s Fall, supra note 443; Reisinger,
It’s Broken, supra note 443. In fact, the proposed “Accountability in Deferred
Prosecution Act of 2008” requires that a monitor be paid according to a pre-determined
fee schedule set by the federal courts. See Brennan, supra note 433. Yet, proposals
supporting predetermined budgets are not risk-free, as “[o]ften times . . . a budget is set
in the monitoring agreement, yet [the monitor] had no input in the process to help the
parties assess the cost and to ensure that the job can be done for the budget already
agreed to.” Bart M. Schwartz, Esq. Becoming a Monitor and Getting the Job Done,
SM051 ALI-ABA 425 (2006).
445. See USAM 9-27.600(A) and (B)(1)(d); Thompson Memorandum, supra note
87, at 5. Unlike DPAs, NPAs are not predicated upon the filing of a formal charging
document and the court is not involved. See Morford Memorandum, supra note 92, at
n.2.
446. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at Attachment D ¶ 4, United States
v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010); Deferred Prosecution
Agreement at Attachment D ¶ 7, United States v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. H-08-287
(S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008); Deferred Prosecution Agreement at Attachment D ¶ 7,
United States v. Technip S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010); Deferred
Prosecution Agreement at 14, United States v. WellCare Health Plans, Inc., No. 8:09cr-00203 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2009).
447. Thomas Brom, Monitoring the Monitors, CAL. LAWYER, May 2006.
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Public disclosure of a monitor’s reports has typically not been
required for a number of compelling reasons.448 The parties to a
criminal, or quasi-criminal, resolution seek to promote a complete and
candid flow of information between the monitor and the Board and the
company’s employees. Both the ongoing dialogue and the monitor’s
report are likely to include highly confidential, commercially sensitive
and proprietary data and information. In addition, corporations
inevitably voluntarily disclose internal and external allegations of
improper, illegal or unethical conduct, as well as the findings and
conclusions of internal audits and investigations, to independent
consultants and monitors. Public disclosure of such information could
compromise the integrity of those processes and hinder the company’s
ability to defend its position in private sector litigation, such as putative
securities class actions.449 Equally important, a legitimate fear of an
unfair collateral attack arising out of public disclosure could discourage
highly qualified candidates from agreeing to serve as a monitor, an
independent compliance consultant or an IRO; law firms faced with the
prospect of even specious charges spawned by public disclosure could
discourage or even prohibit partners from accepting appointments. As a
matter of public policy, administrative and enforcement agencies should
restrict access to the reports submitted by an independent consultant or
monitor, and they should take the position that those documents, and the
company’s responses thereto, are exempt from public disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act or analogous state statutes.450
Finally, the consultant or monitor must adopt a cloistered public
posture that is consistent with her quasi-judicial role. This concern arises
primarily in the context of the monitor’s interaction with the press and
potential clients or customers of the corporation. The consultant or
monitor should be aware that the corporation may “trumpet[] the
presence of a [m]onitor as a way of satisfying customers that everything
was on the up and up.” 451 For all of these reasons, the consultant or
monitor should decline to interact with outside parties absent prior
consultation with, and direct approval by, the enforcement officials and
448.
449.

Id.
Id. Such public disclosure would certainly shed light onto the scope of the
monitor’s duties and reveal the troubles that gave rise to the monitorship.
450. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006). After discussing this issue with the
enforcement officials, monitors and companies should mark all submitted materials
accordingly.
451. Schwartz, supra note 428.
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the corporation.452 The veil of confidentiality should remain in place
after the monitor has completed her work.
CONCLUSION
As fiscal pressures continue to mount on federal, state and local
agencies in the United States and sovereign entities in other nations,
enforcement officials will increasingly turn to independent private sector
oversight as a means of ensuring that corporate transgressors are
rehabilitated and become compliant and responsible citizens in
commerce. The need to adopt this model will be acute in industrial
sectors fueled by public funds. It is inconceivable that domestic or
international regulators will, in the foreseeable future, develop either the
expertise or the resources to perform this function effectively. As the
approach continues to be refined, in design and implementation, and
private sector experience deepens, a new group of professionals will
emerge. They will develop both industrial and regulatory expertise, and
the unique perspective and judgment that are required for this pivotal
role. Ideally, over time, their performance should help improve the
quality of the governance and compliance dialogue in both the
boardroom and the C-suite.

452.

Id.

